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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from Orders entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. This court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. S 34-28-5 (1969) (subsequently amended 1989). 
Separation from payroll - Resignation - Suspension because of 
industrial dispute. (Attached hereto as Addendum Item No. 1.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from a dispute between Appellant Zoll & 
Branch, P.C. ("Zoll & Branch"), and Appellee Alan Asay over wages 
due to Mr. Asay, and payment due to Mr. Asay under a contract in 
which he sold certain computer equipment to Zoll & Branch. 
The case began after Mr. Asay provided Zoll & Branch with 
the statutorily required demand for wages due to him. R. 954-55. 
During the mandatory waiting period, Zoll & Branch filed this suit 
alleging numerous groundless causes of action including slander, 
conversion and fraud. R. 8-12, 1062. Mr. Asay counterclaimed 
against Zoll & Branch in order to collect the money that was owed 
to him as wages and the purchase price of the computer. R. 23-33. 
Subsequently, Mr. Asay filed for relief under Chapter 7 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 1030-32. The trustee for 
Mr. Asay's estate abandoned to Mr. Asay his counterclaims against 
Zoll & Branch, because the wage claim might be subject to an exemp-
tion, and both of the claims were relatively small and subject to 
litigation. R. 1032. Any claims of Zoll & Branch against Mr. Asay 
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were discharged in the bankruptcy case pursuant to order of the 
Bankruptcy Court. R. 450-51. However, the parties hereto proceed-
ed to trial on the basis that the discharge did not effect any off-
sets to which Zoll & Branch might be entitled against Mr. Asay's 
counterclaims. Id. 
After trial, the Third District Court for the State of 
Utah, Judge Michael R. Murphy, entered Judgment in favor of Mr. 
Asay. R. 464-67 based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law included here as Addendum Item No. 5. Among other things, 
Judge Murphy found that Zoll & Branch's motive in "commencing this 
action [was] as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning his 
legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch" (R. 459, H 32) and that 
"there [was] no justification for Zoll & Branch's stop payment 
order to its bank with respect to the checks . . . " issued to 
Mr. Asay. R. 456, H 28. 
During the trial, Mr. B. Ray Zoll was the primary witness 
for Zoll & Branch. Two witnesses, both of them attorneys licensed 
to practice in this State and former employees of Zoll & Branch, 
testified that Mr. B. Ray Zoll's character and reputation for truth-
fulness was bad (R. 1046, 1068) and generally contradicted 
Mr. Zoll's testimony. R. 1039-55, 1055-73. Mr. Asay also testi-
fied that Mr. Zoll's testimony was not true. R. 1123-24. The 
Court found that "Zoll & Branch stopped payments on the checks it 
issued to Mr. Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by 
the password after he found out what it was. Mr. Zoll's testimony 
2 
regarding the basis for the offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not 
credible." R. 455, H 22. 
Following the Judgment, Zoll & Branch filed a Motion for 
a New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
(the "Motion for a New Trial") . R. 470-76. Pending disposition of 
the Motion for New Trial, the court successively stayed execution 
on the judgment for limited periods of time through multiple 
orders. R. 525-30, 596-97, and 617-18. Correct copies of each of 
the orders staying execution on the Judgment are attached hereto as 
Addendum Item No. 6. The last order stayed execution until the 
court ruled upon the Motion for New Trial. R. 617-18. On 20 July 
1993, the court denied the Motion for a New Trial in a document 
entitled Summary Decision and Order. R. 632-34. In rendering its 
decision, the court wrote: 
Plaintiff [Zoll & Branch] and counter-
claim defendant [Zoll & Branch] has moved for 
a new trial or to alter or amend judgment. 
The motion seeks to change specific findings. 
Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, that 
evidence is not the equivalent of fact. The 
court heard all the evidence and, after view-
ing the demeanor of witnesses and making 
judgments of credibility, made its findings. 
If, as in this case, there is conflicting 
evidence, there will necessarily be a conflict 
between the findings and some evidence, the 
evidence which the court rejected in its role 
as a factfinder. 
R. 632. 
On June 16, 1993, Mr. As ay moved to augment the judgment 
to include additional attorneys' fees accrued in order to preserve, 
and collect, the Judgment ("Motion to Augment"). R. 601-03. A 
hearing was held on August 2, 1993. R. 643. At the commencement 
of the hearing, Mr. Zoll offered to make a "proffer." R. 1151. 
Following Zoll & Branch's "proffer" the following occurred: 
The Court: Well, I think I need to take some evidence on 
the fees• 
Mr. Zoll: You can take it. I really don't care. 
(Whereupon Mr. Zoll exits the courtroom) 
The Court: The record should indicate Mr. Zoll is 
walking out, and you may put on your 
evidence, Mr. Zundel. 
* * * 
The Court: The record should indicate that I believe 
under the circumstances that I have the 
power, although I'm not going to use it, of 
contempt over Mr. Zoll for his conduct just 
now. 
However, I'm going to restrain myself and not 
exercise that power and jurisdiction, and 
we'll proceed with the attorney's fees. And 
whatever happens, Mr. Zoll is going to have 
to just live with because he's freely chosen 
to walk out of this courtroom in a very 
abrupt manner. 
R. 1153-54. 
The court thereafter heard the evidence regarding the 
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees incurred by Mr. Asay and took 
notice that the stay of execution had expired on July 20, 1993 (12 
days prior). The court thereupon executed its Order Augmenting 
Judgment and Releasing Cash Bond to Alan Asay (the "Order Augment-
ing Judgment") which Asay's counsel had brought with him to the 
hearing. R. 643. 
Zoll & Branch now appeals the Summary Decision and Order 
and the Order Augmenting Judgment, but no appeal of the judgment 
entered at trial has been filed. See Notice of Appeal, H 2. A 
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correct copy of the Notice of Appeal is included here as Addendum 
Item No. 9. 
In its opening brief, Zoll & Branch challenges Findings 
Nos. 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25-28, and 32-39 as being 
clearly erroneous, and argues that the Court misapplied Utah's wage 
payment statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1969) and that 
the court committed procedural error. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Generally an appellate court only reviews a trial court's 
factual findings for clear error. The trial court's conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. However, where, as here, the 
appellant only appeals the denial of a motion for a new trial, the 
appellate court only reviews the denial for an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court properly exercised its authority under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 611 to control the interrogation of witnesses 
in order to avoid needless consumption of time in this case. The 
court scheduled one day for the hearing and allocated one-half day 
to each party. Zoll & Branch waived any objection to the court's 
invocation of Rule 611 at trial. 
The court properly excluded evidence regarding Mr. Asay's 
"mental condition." Zoll & Branch failed to offer expert 
testimony. 
The testimony of Garry Willmore was properly admitted 
since it was not subject to the attorney-client privilege. Zoll & 
Branch waived any privilege that might have existed by failing to 
object to Mr. Willmore's testimony at Mr. Willmore's deposition. 
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Zoll & Branch failed to properly object to the admissibility of Mr. 
Willmore's testimony at trial. Thus, Zoll & Branch failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal. 
Zoll & Branch has not properly marshalled the evidence 
concerning its contentions that the trial court's factual findings 
are clearly erroneous. Zoll & Branch's contentions are based on 
the mere fact that evidence contrary to some of the findings 
exists. As such, Zoll & Branch's arguments fail to acknowledge the 
burden it carries when challenging the trial court's findings of 
fact. The court's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence and are not clearly erroneous. 
Zoll & Branch's contention that the trial court mis-
applied Utah's wage statutes regarding penalties and attorneys' 
fees is based upon Zoll & Branch's misinterpretation of the 
statute, and upon Zoll & Branch's bold assertions that the court's 
findings of fact are erroneous. The trial court properly assessed 
penalties against Zoll & Branch and awarded to Mr. Asay the 
attorneys' fees he incurred as costs of the suit. 
Zoll & Branch did not tender payment of the wages due to 
Mr. Asay as it argues. Zoll & Branch's deposit with the court was 
not an unconditional offer of payment. The money was not available 
to Mr. Asay until Mr. Asay successfully litigated this matter 
against Zoll & Branch. Zoll & Branch's deposit could not have been 
a "form of interpleader" as it argues, since there were never more 
than two parties to this action. 
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The reasonableness of attorneys' fees in this case must 
be determined in light of all relevant factors, and not solely 
based on the amount in controversy as Zoll & Branch suggests. The 
court considered the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees charged 
in this case and properly determined that the fees were reasonable 
in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Contrary to Zoll & 
Branch's contentions, it was given an opportunity to cross-examine 
Mr. Asay's counsel regarding the fees but chose to use its time 
elsewhere. 
To the extent that Zoll & Branch complains of the 
attorneys' fees awarded in the Order Augmenting Judgment, Zoll & 
Branch waived its right to object to this order when its counsel, 
Mr. Zoll, walked out of the courtroom at the commencement of the 
hearing. The award of attorneys' fees was well supported by the 
record before the trial court and is not clearly erroneous. 
Zoll & Branch's allegations of impropriety stem from its 
insistence that the court improperly released a supersedeas bond to 
Mr. Asay. The bond in this case was filed pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 62(b) and was not a supersedeas bond. The stay of 
execution on the judgment, as amended, had expired at the time the 
bond was released to Mr. Asay. Therefore the court properly 
released the bond to Mr. Asay. 
Mr. Asay is entitled to recover his attorneys' fees 
incurred as a result of this appeal. Under the general rule, a 
prevailing party who received attorney fees below is also entitled 
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Furthermore, Zoll & 
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Branch's appeal is frivolous, and Mr. Asay is entitled to fees on 
appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a). 
Because the trial court's findings of fact are well 
supported by the record and its rulings of law are correct, the 
trial court's denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for a new trial was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
Generally, an appellate court will only review the trial 
court's factual findings for clear error. E.g., Cummings v. 
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id. In the 
present case, Zoll & Branch has not appealed the underlying judg-
ment in this matter. Rather, Zoll & Branch appeals the Summary 
Decision and Order, whereby the trial court denied Zoll & Branch's 
Motion for a New Trial, and the Order Augmenting Judgment. Since 
the underlying judgment under Rule 59 is not on appeal, nothing in 
this case is reviewed without recognizing broad discretion in the 
trial court. 
With regard to the denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for 
a New Trial, it is well settled that the trial court has broad 
discretionary power to grant or deny a motion brought under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59. E.g., Hancock v. Planned Development 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 
170, 173 (Utah 1983). An appellant bears the heavy burden of 
showing that the trial court's denial of such a motion was a clear 
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abuse of discretion. Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., supra; 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986); Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). Under Anderson v. Toone, 
supra, when the motion for a new trial is based upon an allegation 
that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, an appellate 
court will not reverse the denial of the motion unless the 
"evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
and unjust." 671 P.2d at 173. In this case, the trial court's 
rulings were proper and its findings of fact are well supported by 
the record. Zoll & Branch has not shown otherwise. 
With respect to the Order Augmenting Judgment, Zoll & 
Branch fails to carry its burden on appeal to show that the 
findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous, or that its 
conclusions of law were incorrect. Therefore, the Order Augmenting 
Judgment must be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEDURAL RULINGS WERE PROPER AND DO 
NOT CONSTITUTE PROCEDURAL ERROR. 
A. The court properly exercised its authority under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 611 to control the 
interrogation of witnesses and avoid needless 
consumption of time in this case. 
Zoll & Branch complains that the court scheduled only one 
full day for the trial of this case, and limited each party to one-
half of the day for the presentation of its case. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 31. In its Summary Decision and Order, from which Zoll 
& Branch appeals, the trial court explained that 
The court was very concerned about this case, 
invoked Rule 611, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
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allocated 50% of the trial day to each party 
and was timekeeper for the time consumed. 
Plaintiff actually used more time than defen-
dant and had adequate time to present its 
claims and defenses. It was the plaintiff's 
decision how it was to use its time. It is 
the court's view that plaintiff misallocated 
its time, spending too much time on unimpor-
tant matters and too little on important 
matters. 
R. 633. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 611, the trial court has 
considerable discretion to manage the introduction of evidence and 
to see that it is presented efficiently. In re Estate of Russell, 
852 P.2d 997, 998-99 (Utah 1993). The appellate court will review 
the lower court's rulings based on Rule 611 only for abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
Zoll & Branch's contention is based on its assertion that 
the time constraints did not allow it to present its entire case. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 31. However, shortly after 2:00, when the 
court reconvened from the lunch break, the court stated "[a]s we 
proceed with this case I'm seeing the wisdom of my invocation of 
Rule 611," to which Mr. Zoll replied "I am, too." R. 1002, 1008. 
Furthermore, long after Zoll & Branch's allotted time had expired, 
the court asked counsel for Zoll & Branch M[w]hat other witnesses, 
if you were allowed to call them, would you call?" R. 1117. Tom 
D. Branch, co-counsel for Zoll & Branch, responded 
Myself, and Mr. Steven Branch your honor. 
My testify [sic] would be corroborating Mr. 
Zoll's, except for I guess it would be the 
fact that he testified about the billing logs. 
Steve Branch's testimony would be that he 
looked for the billing logs. That would be 
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cumulative, as well, so I think that in the 
interest of time I think we have put in the 
substantive evidence we need. 
R. 1117-18 (emphasis added). Clearly, Zoll & Branch waived any 
objection it had regarding the court's invocation of Rule 611. 
Only after the court rendered its decision against Zoll & Branch 
did it protest the court's invocation of Rule 611. 
B. Evidence regarding Mr. Asay's "mental condition" was 
properly excluded. 
Zoll & Branch asserts that the trial court erred in 
sustaining Mr. Asay's objection to Zoll & Branch's question 
regarding Mr. Asay's medical history. Zoll & Branch argues that 
Mr. Asay's medical history is admissible under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 608. Appellant's Brief, 31. Rule 608 allows evidence 
regarding the credibility of a witness, in the form of opinion or 
reputation, only if it refers to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. 
After the court sustained Mr. Asay's objection, Zoll & 
Branch explained that the question was intended to elicit evidence 
that Mr. Asay had a "mental condition" which Zoll & Branch claimed 
affected his credibility. R. 971-71. Zoll & Branch conceded, 
however, that it was not prepared to offer expert testimony on the 
issues. Id. The trial court properly ruled that a lay witness was 
not qualified to establish that a "mental condition" affected an 
individual's credibility and thus excluded the evidence. Id. 
11 
C. The court properly admitted the deposition testimony 
of Mr. Willmore. 
Zoll & Branch asserts error because of the admission of 
the testimony of Mr. Willmore and argues that the testimony invaded 
the attorney-client privilege. Zoll & Branch's argument fails for 
three reasons: first, the testimony was not protected by the 
attorney-client privilege; second, even assuming that a privilege 
existed, Zoll & Branch waived the privilege by failing to properly 
object to the taking of Mr. Willmore's testimony at deposition; and 
third, Zoll & Branch failed to properly object to the testimony at 
trial. 
1. The testimony of Mr. Willmore was not 
protected by attorney-client privilege. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b), only confidential 
communications between a client and his attorney that pertain to 
the subject matter for which the attorney was retained are 
protected under the attorney-client privilege. Utah R. Evid. 504. 
Non-confidential communications, or those which are unrelated to 
the attorney-client relationship are not protected under the 
privilege. Id. 
At trial, Mr. Asay's counsel read into the record 
portions of Mr. Willmore's deposition regarding Mr. Willmore's 
communications with Mr. Asay, his experience using the computer 
system that Mr. Asay sold to Zoll & Branch, the non-existence of 
facts concerning Mr. Asay's employment supportive of Zoll & 
Branch's claims, and the poor reputation of Mr. Zoll among members 
of the legal community for truth and veracity. R. 1039-48. None 
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of the excerpts read into the record addressed confidential 
communications between Zoll & Branch and its counsel in any way. 
Thus, the excerpts do not fall within the attorney-client 
privilege. 
2. Even assuming that a privilege existed, it was 
waived by failing to object to the taking of 
Mr, Willmoreys deposition. 
The attorney-client privilege may be waived if the holder 
thereof voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any 
significant part of the communication. Utah R. of Evid. 507. 
M[I]f the holder of the privilege fails to claim his privilege by 
objecting to disclosure by himself or another witness when he has 
an opportunity to do so, he waives his privilege as to the 
communications so disclosed." E. Cleary, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93, 
at pp. 223-24 (3d. ed. 1984). The privilege is waived as to 
communications between a client and its attorney that are made in 
the presence of third persons whose presence is not reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances. Hofmann v. Conder, 712 P.2d 
216, 216-17 (Utah 1985). 
When Mr. Asay's counsel deposed Mr. Willmore, Zoll & 
Branch did not object to the deposition or to any of the questions 
based on the attorney-client privilege. R. 1038. By failing to 
object, Zoll & Branch allowed disclosure of all matter contained in 
Mr. Willmore's deposition. 
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3. Zoll & Branch failed to Properly Object at 
Trial to the Admissibility of Mr, Willmore's 
Testimony with Regard to Attorney-Client 
Privilege. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling that admits evidence unless a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the 
specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context. When asserting the attorney-client 
privilege, a bald assertion of privilege is insufficient. 4 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 2 6.60 [01], 
p. 26-162 (2d. ed. 1985). Rather, the privilege must be invoked as 
to specific questions or documents. Id. 
When the deposition testimony of Mr. Willmore was offered 
at trial, Zoll & Branch initially objected to the reading of less 
than the entire transcript of the testimony of Mr. Willmore and 
then subsequently on the basis that the testimony violated the 
attorney-client privilege. R. 1035-1037. The court properly 
reserved its ruling on the latter issue, but invited Zoll & Branch 
to object again if the proffered question was subject to an 
unwaived privilege. R. 1038. The court stated "[w]ell, let's hear 
the question and make your objection, then I'll determine whether 
it's been waived. And if not waived, whether it is subject to the 
attorney-client privilege." Id. 
Thereafter, both parties offered relevant excerpts from 
the deposition testimony without objection by Zoll & Branch based 
on attorney-client privilege. R. 1039-55. After the testimony was 
received, Zoll & Branch did not move to strike it. 
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III. THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN THIS CASE ARE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE, AND ZOLL & BRANCH HAS NOT PROPERLY 
MARSHALLED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING ITS CONTENTIONS 
TO THE CONTRARY. 
In order to successfully challenge the correctness of a 
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must ordinarily first 
marshal all the evidence supporting the findings, and then 
demonstrate that, viewed in the light most favorable to the lower 
court's findings, the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the findings. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 
(Utah 1989). In this regard, this court has recently stated: 
This court will not lightly disturb a 
trial court's findings of fact. In challeng-
ing a court's findings of fact on appeal, an 
appellant must marshal all 'the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous.' If appellant fails to marshal the evidence, we will assume 
that the record supports the trial court's findings of fact and proceed to review the 
accuracy of the trial court's conclusions of 
law. 
Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 
1993) (emphasis added and citation omitted).1 In Clayton, the 
court noted that the appellant had merely selected those facts and 
excerpts that supported its position and re-argued those facts as 
if its appeal were a trial de novo. Id. This court stated that 
such an approach "ignores the heavy burden that [the appellant] 
xThe court's statements in Clayton are of particular significance to the 
present case since Mr. Zoll, counsel for Zoll & Branch, also represented the 
appellants in Clayton. 
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must carry to properly challenge the trial court's findings of 
fact." Id. 
Once the evidence is properly marshalled, the standard by 
which the sufficiency of the evidence is judged is set out in Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Rule 52(a) states: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
In the present case, Zoll & Branch fails to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Rather, similar 
to what the appellant did in Clayton. Zoll & Branch selects only a 
portion of the relevant evidence and then reargues its factual 
position. 
Zoll & Branch fails to carry the additional burden of 
showing that the trial court's denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for 
a New Trial was an abuse of discretion. 
A. If all of the evidence were marshal led. there is 
sufficient evidence to support each of the court's 
factual findings. 
1. Factual Finding No, 5, 
Zoll & Branch contests Finding No. 5 which states, 
During his employment with Zoll & Branch, 
Mr. Asay learned to distrust Mr. B. Ray Zoll. 
Consequently, near the end of his employment, 
Mr. Asay placed the password "fuckoff" on the 
computer system to ensure that he controlled 
the system until a final agreement for its 
purchase was reached. 
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Zoll & Branch argues that the finding is clearly erroneous because 
testimony existed that Mr. Asay was "attempting to block access to 
certain files." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. 
The unstated context of the snippet of testimony 
presented by Zoll & Branch concerns negotiations over the price of 
the computer system purchased by Mr. Asay and sold to Zoll & 
Branch. The record states: 
[Counsel] Did the delay in negotiations in reaching a 
final figure concern you? 
[Asay] Yes, it did. 
[Counsel] Why? 
[Asay] I was afra id that there would be some e f f o r t 
t o take control of the computer system on 
t h e i r part . In other words, change the locks 
or somehow make the computer system unava i l -
able to me, or simply take i t . Find some way 
of e x e r c i s i n g leverage in these n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
So I protected the computer system. 
R. 941. In i t s br i e f , Zoll & Branch concedes that t h i s passage 
"could support a f inding of the motive as character ized in Finding 
No. 5." Appel lant ' s Brief , p. 13 . 2 
The record supports the c o u r t ' s f inding that Mr. Asay 
used the password to block access to c e r t a i n f^ le s because he 
2
 Zoll & Branch a l so argues that because Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d that he 
f e l t no ob l i ga t ion t o a s s i s t Zoll & Branch af ter he l e f t , that the password 
placed on the computer before he l e f t was somehow an act of anger and revenge. 
Appel lant 's Brief , p. 13. Zoll & Branch's argument i s not only i r r e l e v a n t , i t 
d i s t o r t s Mr. Asay's testimony by presenting i t out of context . When read in 
context , in the passage t o which Zoll & Branch r e f e r s , Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d 
So I f e l t no ob l igat ion t o do s o . I would have 
done so , and did do so as a favor. I f e l t sympathetic 
toward Garry, who was in a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n , having t o 
do something that he had had no experience or t ra in ing 
i n . But I d idn' t f e e l l i k e I had any ob l iga t ion t o Zoll 
& Branch t o do i t . 
(R. 990 (Emphasis added.)) 
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distrusted Zoll & Branch. Therefore, Factual Finding No. 5 cannot 
be said to be clearly erroneous. 
2. Factual Finding No. 6. 
Finding No. 6 states: 
Mr. Asay placed the password on the word 
processing files using the standard Word-
Perfect command, "Password"/"Add". Once the 
password was revealed, it could be removed by 
using the standard WordPerfect command, 
"Pas sword"/"Remove". 
Once again Zoll & Branch refers vaguely to evidence that 
supports the court's finding, but does not marshal that evidence 
and present it to the appellate court. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. 
In the referenced passage, counsel for Zoll & Branch asks 
Mr. Asay whether certain files were locked and Mr. Asay responded 
"No. It was accessible by giving the password." R. 1021. In 
addition to this testimony, Zoll & Branch fails to acknowledge the 
following testimony of Mr. Willmore, which also supports the 
finding: 
[Counsel] Did he show you what files were in the 
computer? 
[Willmore] He did. 
[Counsel] Did he reveal to you all passwords regarding — 
[Willmore] He did. 
* * * 
[Counsel] But he gave you the password? 
[Willmore] He did give me the password. 
[Counsel] So was the access in fact blocked? 
[Willmore] No. 
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[Counsel] Okay. Did you eventually learn how to remove 
the password? 
[Willmore] Yes, I did. 
[Counsel] What did it take to remove the password? 
[Willmore] It was a very simple application of — it was 
part of the Word Perfect [sic] program, I had 
understood based on — 
[Counsel] It was part of Word Perfect — 
[Willmore] It was part of the Word Perfect program, yes. 
[Counsel] It was a standard Word Perfect Command? 
[Willmore ] Yes. 
[Counsel] How long did it take you to remove a password 
when the password would come up? 
[Willmore] Perhaps 15 seconds. 
R. 1041-43. In addition, Zoll & Branch's witness, Mr. Van Valken-
berg, testified that the password was a WordPerfect function and 
could easily be removed once the password was known. R. 1098. 
Contrary to Zoll & Branch's contentions, Mr. Van Valkenberg's 
testimony does not rebut this finding, but rather confirms it. 
3. Factual Finding No, 15. 
Factual Finding No. 15 states ,f[t]he password provided 
full access to every file in the computer system. At no time did 
Mr. Asay sabotage the computer in any way." R. 454, IF 15. In 
addition to the testimony that Zoll & Branch vaguely refers to (R. 
987, 1043, 1123), unmarshalled testimony by Mr. Willmore states 
that Mr. Asay had been "extremely helpful," had shown him the files 
on the computer and had revealed the password, and that access to 
the computer's files was not blocked. R. 1041-42. 
19 
Zoll & Branch ignores Mr, Willmore's testimony and selec-
tively presents other testimony that it interprets as supporting 
its position that additional passwords existed. Appellant's Brief, 
15. Once again, Zoll & Branch: 
fails to acknowledge . . . that evidence is 
not the equivalent of fact. The court heard 
all the evidence and, after viewing the 
demeanor of witnesses and making judgments of 
credibility, made its findings. If# as in 
this case, there is conflicting evidence, 
there will necessarily be a conflict between 
the findings and some evidence, the evidence 
which the court rejected in its role as fact-
finder. 
Summary Decision and Order, R. 632. 
4. Factual Finding No. 16. 
Factual Finding No. 16 states: 
Any problems which Zoll & Branch had in acces-
sing the computer system either pre-existed 
the exchange of the password for the check for 
the computer system or were the result of Zoll 
& Branch or its representatives being untrain-
ed or uneducated in the use of the computer 
system. 
R. 454, 1f 16. 
Zoll & Branch challenges Factual Finding No. 16. Appel-
lant's Brief, pp. 15-16 However, it presents absolutely no 
evidence to support or contradict the court's finding. Id. 
Mr. Van Valkenberg testified that his first visit was in 
late November or early December and at that time Zoll & Branch did 
not have the password. R. 1093. Mr. Asay's testimony confirmed 
that Mr. Van Valkenberg's first visit occurred before he left the 
firm, and consequently before the sale of the computer to Zoll & 
Branch or the exchange of the password. R. 1123. Mr. Van 
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Valkenberg also testified that upon his second visit the password 
had been revealed. R. 1096. Furthermore, Mr. Asay testified that 
prior to his departure he had hidden files on the computer, but 
that when he left the firm all files were exposed and he gave the 
password to all files upon his departure. R. 1123. It is 
irrelevant whether or not Mr. Asay chose to protect the files with 
a password or by hiding them while he owned the computer. The 
evidence supports the court's finding that Mr. Asay revealed the 
password to Zoll & Branch at the time of sale. 
Zoll & Branch argues that even if Finding No. 16 is 
correct, the denial of access to files should be considered 
sabotage because Mr. Asay said that Mr. Willmore had called him 
numerous times for help in accessing files. Appellant's Brief, p. 
16. Not only does Zoll & Branch's version of Mr. Asay's testimony 
not support its conclusion, Zoll & Branch distorts Mr. Asay's 
testimony once again. Mr. Asay's testimony was that Mr. Willmore's 
problems were not related to the password, but to his own 
inexperience with the computer. R. 988-90. 
5. Factual Finding No. 8. 
The amount of time which Mr. Asay billed 
during his employment with Zoll & Branch was 
fair and consistent with his obligation to 
Zoll & Branch and its clients and was fairly 
and accurately reported on Mr. Asay's time 
sheets. 
R. 453. 
Zoll & Branch challenges this finding on the basis that 
Mr. Zoll expected more hours than were billed, and that Mr. Zoll 
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testified that this was a condition of employment. Appellant's 
brief, p. 16. 
However, Zoll & Branch again misrepresents the witness' 
testimony. In stating that Mr. Zoll expected 7-8 billable hours 
per day, Mr. Asay and his former fellow associate of Zoll & Branch, 
Mr. Drake, were expressly distinguishing Mr. Zoll's expectations 
from the conditions of their employment. R. 963-64, 975-76, 1057. 
Furthermore, Zoll & Branch ignores other testimony that because of 
the administrative tasks Mr. Asay was required to perform, such as 
secretarial work and delivering documents to the court, Mr. Asay 
was not able to bill the expected number of hours per day. R. 977; 
453, H 9. Zoll & Branch also fails to acknowledge that Mr. Zoll's 
testimony, as quoted in Appellant's Brief at page 17, was contro-
verted by Mr. Asay's testimony, who testified that Mr. Zoll's 
testimony was untrue. R. 1123-24. 
When all of the evidence is viewed in its proper light, 
giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to evaluate the 
witnesses' demeanor and credibility, there is ample evidence to 
support the court's finding. 
6. Factual Finding No. 11. 
Following negotiations, Zoll & Branch 
agreed to buy only the computer system for 
$1,030.00, which was the fair market value of 
the computer system. Mr. Asay accurately 
represented all material facts to Zoll & 
Branch during the negotiations. 
Zoll & Branch contests the trial court's finding that the 
price it paid for the computer was fair market value, and that Mr. 
Asay had accurately represented all material facts to Zoll & Branch 
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during negotiations. Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19. In support of 
its argument it cites Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony that the total 
price paid was in excess of the computer's value at the time of the 
sale, and that replacing a 1987 disk with a 1984 disk would lessen 
the value of the computer. Id. 
Zoll & Branch's argument about value does not inform the 
court of what the valuation issue was between Zoll & Branch and Mr. 
Asay. Mr. Asay testified that he had negotiated with Zoll & Branch 
over the point in time at which the computer should be valued, 
whether at the time purchased by Asay or at the time of the 
proposed sale to Zoll & Branch. R. 942. The computer originally 
purchased by Mr. Asay was used almost exclusively in his employment 
with Zoll & Branch. Id. The price finally agreed upon represented 
a compromise. Id. 
Zoll & Branch also fails to acknowledge Mr. Asay's 
testimony that the 1987 hard drive was replaced because it had 
completely stopped working. R. 995. Under the circumstances, 
replacing the failed hard disk with a drive manufactured earlier 
did not necessarily affect the value of the computer. R. 995. 
7. Factual Finding No. 17. 
The trial court found that: 
None of Defendant's actions and conduct 
regarding the computer system were improper or 
inappropriate. 
R. 454, H 17. Zoll & Branch's arguments focus on Mr. Asay's 
replacement of a broken 1987 hard drive with a working 1984 hard 
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d r i v e . 3 As noted above, the hard drive that was removed from the 
system had completely stopped working. R. 995. 
After evaluat ing all of the evidence, the court 
determined that none of Mr. Asay's conduct was improper. In i t s 
br i e f , Zoll & Branch o f fers only a port ion of the evidence 
presented to the court and d i s t o r t s that evidence by present ing i t 
t o t h i s court out of context . Therefore, Zol l & Branch has not 
properly marshalled the evidence. 
8. Factual Finding No. 19. 
Zoll & Branch chal lenges the t r i a l cour t ' s f inding t h a t : 
When Mr. Asay l e f t Zoll & Branch, he l e f t 
behind a l l of h i s work product pertaining to 
any case on which he had worked. Mr. Asay 
a l s o properly l e f t behind h i s time sheets at 
Zoll & Branch, which should have been found by 
Zoll & Branch on the premises with no 
d i f f i c u l t y whatsoever. 
Zoll & Branch misrepresents the testimony that i t c i t e s 
in i t s br i e f . Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d as to the ordinary course of 
business with regard to the manner in which he submitted h i s 
b i l l i n g s , s t a t i n g "I d idn' t ac tua l ly turn them i n . They were jus t 
always kept in a place on my desk, and the secretary would come and 
get them." R. 967. Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d that i t was h i s custom to 
In an attempt t o show that Mr. Asay had acted inappropriately, Zoll 
& Branch a l so quotes Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony regarding Mr. Asay's poss ib le 
motives for hiding f i l e s . Appellant's Brief, p. 20. However, Zoll & Branch does 
not point out that immediately following the testimony which i t quotes in i t s 
br ief , the court sustained an object ion to that very testimony. (R. 1104) 
Furthermore, the testimony i s irre levant t o the i s s u e , s ince , as 
already s ta ted , the evidence indicates that Mr. Van Valkenberg's f i r s t v i s i t , 
wherein he found the hidden f i l e s to which he referred, was before the computer 
was sold to Zoll & Branch, and while i t was s t i l l owned by Mr. Asay, and that Mr. 
Asay had exposed a l l f i l e s before s e l l i n g the computer. (Supra at 20; R. 1123.) 
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leave his billing sheets on his desk for Mr. Zoll's secretary to 
collect, but since he had already moved his desk from the office, 
he left them on the floor because that was "as close as possible to 
the same location." R. 969; see also, R. 1012, 1059-61. 
Zoll & Branch also ignores the testimony of Mr. Drake 
that supports the court's findings. Mr. Drake testified that as he 
remembered, Mr. Asay's practice was to place the time-sheets in a 
box on his desk for the secretary to collect. R. 1060-61. 
When read in proper context, the passage cited by Zoll & 
Branch does not show that the ordinary course of business was for 
Mr. Asay to hand-deliver his time sheets to a secretary. In 
addition, Mr. Asay testified that all computer disks that he took 
with him upon leaving were disks that he had purchased himself that 
Zoll & Branch had not purchased from him, and that all work product 
was left on the computer's hard drive. R. 1016, 1021. 
Once again, Zoll & Branch has failed to marshal all of 
the evidence. 
9. Factual Finding No. 22, 
In Finding No. 22, the trial court found that: 
In defense of Zoll and Branch's actions, 
Mr. Zoll testified that he stopped payment on 
the checks because Zoll & Branch had offset-
ting claims against Mr. Asay. The Court dis-
agrees . Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the 
checks it issued to Mr. Asay for the sole 
reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the pass-
word after he found out what it was. Mr. 
Zoll's testimony regarding the basis for the 
offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not 
credible. 
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R. 455, 11 22. Zoll & Branch challenges this finding as unsupported 
by the record, and then simply cites Mr. Zoll's testimony, which 
the court found not to be credible, to show that the claimed 
offsets were legitimate. Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22. Zoll & 
Branch also quotes Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony wherein Mr. Van 
Valkenberg testifies as to what Mr. Zoll had told him. Id. at 23. 
In the quoted portion of the record Mr. Zoll attempts to 
justify the claimed offsets based upon three factors: (1) the 
password; (2) the valuation of the computer; and (3) Mr. Asay's 
billing statements. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Each of the three 
factors asserted to justify Zoll & Branch's claimed offsets are 
addressed above. As noted above, Zoll & Branch has not marshalled 
the evidence regarding the issues that it argues to support its 
claimed offsets. 
Zoll & Branch merely ignores its burden on appeal and the 
trial court's role as a judge of the witness's credibility. 
10. Factual Findings Nos. 25-28. 
Zoll & Branch's challenge to Findings Nos. 25-28 relies 
upon its premise that the other findings challenged by Zoll & 
Branch are clearly erroneous. Appellant's Brief, p. 23. In 
Factual Findings 25 through 28, the court found that: 
25. Mr. Asay did not convert any 
documents or other property of Zoll & Branch 
to his own use. 
26. Mr. Asay did not make any misrepre-
sentation to Zoll & Branch regarding any 
aspect of the computer he sold to Zoll & 
Branch. 
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27. Mr. Asay did not slander Zoll & 
Branch as alleged in the complaint filed by 
that firm. 
28. There is no justification for Zoll & 
Branch's stop payment order to its bank with 
respect to the checks at issue in this case. 
R. 456. 
Zoll & Branch summarily challenges these findings as 
"contrary to facts found in the transcript, especially in regard to 
Wilmore's [sic] own deposition testimony, to Asay's misrepresenta-
tions pertaining to the computer, to the justification for Zoll & 
Branch's stop payment order, and to respondent's failure to fulfill 
his part of the employment agreement, as has been argued above." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 23. Each of Zoll & Branch's contentions 
regarding these findings is addressed above, and need not be 
reargued here. 
These findings are well supported by the record and by 
the other findings of the court upon which findings 25 through 28 
rest. Even if the evidence had been properly marshalled, the 
findings are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, Factual Findings 
Nos. 25-28 must also be affirmed. 
11. Factual Finding No. 32. 
In its Factual Finding No. 32, the trial court expressly 
found that "[d]uring the trial of the above-entitled actions, the 
testimony of Mr. Asay was more credible than the testimony of Mr. 
Zoll." R. 457, U 32. Zoll & Branch challenges this finding on the 
grounds that there is no support for it in the record, and (without 
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citing the record) that it is "controverted by facts in the 
transcript." Appellant's Brief, p. 24. 
It is expressly within the province of the trial judge's 
authority to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). Furthermore, once again Zoll & Branch fails to marshal 
the evidence which supports the trial court's finding. In addition 
to the intangible evidence, such as the demeanor of the witnesses, 
the court received unrebutted testimony from two separate witnesses 
regarding Mr. Zoll's lack of credibility. Both of these witnesses 
are members in good standing of the Utah State Bar, and both had 
worked as employees of Zoll & Branch. Mr. Willmore testified that 
Mr. Zoll's reputation in the legal community for truth and veracity 
was "extremely poor." R. 1046. Similarly, Mr. Drake testified 
that other attorneys "don't have a high opinion of Mr. Zoll" for 
truthfulness. R. 1068. 
Based upon the trial court's observation of the 
witnesses, and the testimony regarding Mr. Zoll's credibility, the 
trial court's finding that Mr. Asay's testimony was more credible 
than Mr. Zoll's is not clearly erroneous. 
12. Factual Findings Nos. 33-38. 
In its Findings Nos. 33-38, the trial court states: 
33. Mr. Asay is entitled to receive the 
following monetary damages from Zoll & Branch 
as a result of Zoll & Branch's failure to pay 
Mr. Asay his wages due and its failure to pay 
for the computer system: 
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Wages and Penalties; 
Wage check 12/01/88 -
Statutory Continuation 
of Salary -
Plus interest from 02/01/89 
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or 
$ 2.05479 per diem for 1,438 days 
Breach of Contract; 
Computer payment 
Plus interest from 12/01/88 
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or $ .2821 
per diem for 1,498 days 
Attorneys' Fees; 
Through preparation of Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment 
Out-of-pocket expenses and costs 
$ 1,500.00 
$ 6,000.00 
I 
18
Principal 
$ 
$ 
$ 
7,500.00 
2,951.79 
1,030.00 
Interest 
327.10 
$ 12,000.00 
1,602.79 
TOTAL DAMAGES: $ 25,411.68 
34. Mr. Asay is also entitled to 
additional interest from and after January 8, 
1993, at the rates provided under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4. 
35. The Court has considered all of the 
relevant factors in determining the reasonable-
ness of the fees and costs requested by Mr. 
Asay and his attorneys. In this regard the 
testimony of Mr. Asay, who is a licensed 
attorney in this state, was helpful as well 
as the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel, Mr. 
Michael N. Zundel. The Court also observed the 
organized and efficient manner in which Mr. 
Asay's counsel conducted the presentation of 
Mr. Asay's case at trial. All of the services 
provided by Mr. Asay's counsel were reasonable 
and necessary. 
36. The hourly rates charged to Mr. Asay 
by his attorneys, for their time and the time 
of their paralegals, are reasonable in light 
of the training, experience and expertise of 
the service providers and as measured by the 
hourly rates customarily charged for similar 
services in the Salt Lake City community. 
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37. Through November 30, 1992, a total 
of 129.30 hours of legal services were pro-
vided to Mr. Asay by his attorneys in connec-
tion with Mr. Asay's attempts to recover the 
wages do him from Zoll & Branch. The hours of 
service were necessitated by the actions of 
Zoll & Branch both before and after this 
action was begun, including the following 
actions: 1) failing to pay Mr. Asay the wages 
justly due him, 2) commencing this action as a 
tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning 
his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch, 
3) refusing to provide discovery as required 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 4) 
alleging numerous defenses, including factu-
ally contested offsets, to Mr. Asay's claims. 
38. Upon consideration of all of the 
circumstances it is the judgment of this court 
that Mr. Asay should be awarded $12,000.00 in 
attorneys' fees through the preparation of the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment in this case and that Mr. Asay's 
attorneys' out-of-pocket costs of $1,602.79 
should also be awarded. 
With regard to Findings Nos. 33-38, Zoll & Branch 
concedes that the record supports the findings, but then merely 
states that Zoll & Branch "rebuts these findings." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 24. Once again Zoll & Branch ignores its burden to 
marshal all of the evidence, and then to show that the court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
IV. ZOLL & BRANCH'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE 
STATUTE IS BASED UPON A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE 
AND ITS CONTENTION THAT THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Zoll & Branch argues that the trial court's reliance on 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1969) (subsequently amended 1989) is 
improper for three reasons: first, it argues that the statute was 
misconstrued; second, it reargues against the court's factual 
findings that contradict its position that no wages were due to Mr. 
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Asay because of a claimed set-off; and third, it argues that it 
properly tendered payment by depositing money with the court as a 
"form of interpleader." Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-36. Zoll & 
Branch's construction of the statute is contrary to the plain 
meaning of the statute. As already noted, the court's factual 
findings have not been shown to be clearly erroneous. While Zoll 
& Branch may have deposited funds with the court, there was no 
tender of payment of the wages due to Mr. Asay. Therefore, Zoll & 
Branch's arguments are each without merit. 
A. The trial court properly applied Utah Code Ann. 
S 34-28-5 (1969) to award Mr, Asay damages for 
wages wrongfully withheld by Zoll & Branch. 
Zoll & Branch argues that because Mr. Asay voluntarily 
quit or resigned his employment. The court should have relied only 
on Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) and that it was improper to rely on 
the penalty provision of section 34-28-5(1). Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 32-34. Zoll & Branch argues that the trial court's construc-
tion of the statute is against public policy and that M[t]his court 
must take the blinders off the Third District Court judge who 
believes that statutes should be broadly applied in all cases 
against employers." Appellant's Brief, p. 38. 
It is a well recognized rule of statutory construction 
that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
court need not look beyond the language of the statute to determine 
its meaning. E.g., OSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 381, 384 (Utah App. 1993); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 
P.2d 263, 265 (Utah App. 1993). While the court will not ignore 
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the statute's plain meaning, under Utah law the courts are to 
liberally construe statutes with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 
(1993). See also. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357# 1373 (Utah 
App. 1993) (Garff, J., concurring). 
Section 34-28-5 states: 
(1) Whenever an employer separates an 
employee from his payroll, the unpaid wages 
shall become due immediately, and the employer 
shall pay such wages to the employee within 24 
hours of the time of separation at the speci-
fied place of employment. 
In case of failure to pay wages due an 
employee within 24 hours of demand therefor, 
the wages of such employee shall continue from 
the date of separation until paid, but in no 
event to exceed sixty days, at the same rate 
which the employee received at the time of 
separation. The employee may recover the 
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil 
action. This action must be commenced within 
sixty days from the date of separation. Any 
employee who has not made a demand for payment 
shall not be entitled to any such penalty 
under this subsection. 
(2) Whenever an employee (not having a 
written contract for a definite period) quits 
or resigns his employment, the wages earned 
shall become due and payable not later than 72 
hours thereafter, unless such employee shall 
have given 72 hours' previous notice o-f his 
intention to quit, in which latter case such 
employee shall receive his wages at the speci-
fied place of payment at the time of quitting. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1988) (emphasis added). 
Under the plain meaning of section 34-28-5, subsection 
(1) provides for a penalty where an employer fails to pay wages due 
an employee within 24 hours of a demand therefor, and subsection 
(2) defines the point in time wages become due when an employee 
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quits or resigns his employment. This statue must be read as a 
whole and not in piecemeal fashion in order to effect the objects 
of this statute and to promote justice. Silver v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 820 P.2d 912 (Utah 1991). 
Zoll & Branch failed to pay the wages due to Mr. Asay 
within 24 hours of the time they became due, and continued to 
refuse to pay Mr. Asay's wages. Mr. Asay ultimately received his 
wages only after executing upon the Judgment entered by the trial 
court in this case. Therefore, it was proper for the court to rely 
on the plain meaning of section 34-28-5 and apply the penalties 
provided therein to this case. 
Zoll & Branch also argues that a bona fide dispute 
existed as to the wages. Appellant's Brief, p. 35, citing Chatter-
lv v. Omnico, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App. 1971). Zoll & Branch 
cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that where 
an employer acts reasonably and in good faith, and where the 
failure to pay was not willful, the penalty provision should not 
apply. Appellant's Brief, p. 35. 
The cases cited by Zoll & Branch are inapposite to the 
present case. The trial court expressly rejected Zoll & Branch's 
claim that it had acted reasonably and in good faith, by finding 
that "Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the checks it issued to Mr. 
Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the password 
after he found out what it was" and that Zoll & Branch had com-
menced suit against Mr. Asay "as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into 
abandoning his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch." R. 455, 
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H 22; 459, H 37. Zoll & Branch's argument tha t i t s f a i lu re to pay 
was not wilful and was due to the claimed set -off amount i s not 
cons is ten t with the facts of t h i s case . 
B. Because the t r i a l c o u r t ' s factual findings are not 
c l e a r l y erroneous, Zoll & Branch's contention t h a t 
the pena l t i e s under Utah Code Ann, S 34-28-5 (1988) 
should not have been applied in t h i s case i s 
without mer i t , 
Zoll & Branch argues in the a l t e rna t i ve tha t the wages 
were not " jus t ly due" to Mr. Asay because Zoll & Branch claimed a 
se t -off . 4 Appel lant ' s Brief, p . 34. However, the t r i a l court 
expressly found tha t the evidence regarding Zoll & Branch's claimed 
r i gh t of se t -off was not c red ib le . R. 455, H 22. 
The facts on which Zoll & Branch r e l i e s for i t s argument 
are contradic ted by the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f indings. Zoll & Branch has 
not properly marshalled the evidence supporting these f indings, and 
consequently has not shown tha t the c o u r t ' s findings are c l e a r l y 
erroneous. Therefore, Zoll & Branch's argument tha t Mr. Asay's 
wages were not j u s t l y due has no basis beyond Mr. Zo l l ' s bald 
a s s e r t i o n s . 
C. Zoll & Branch did not properly tender payment of 
the wages due to Mr. Asay. 
Zoll & Branch deposited $1,176.75 with the court c le rk 
which i t charac ter izes as a "Tender of Payment" or a "form of 
4In support of i t s claimed right of s e t - o f f Zoll & Branch c i t e s UCA § 34-28-
3 ( 5 ) . Prior to 1989 no sec t ion numbered 34-28-3(5) ex i s ted in Utah Sta tutes . 
The s t a t u t e s were amended in 1989 to add UCA § 34-28-3(5) . Since a l l material 
events in t h i s case occurred prior to 1989, UCA § 34-28-3(5) (1989) i s 
inappl icable to t h i s case , QSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, supra, at 
383 (Party i s e n t i t l e d t o have i t s r ights determined on the bas is of the law as 
i t ex i s t ed at the time of the occurrence, and a la ter s ta tute or amendment should 
not be applied re t roac t ive ly so as to deprive a party of i t s r i g h t s . ) 
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interpleader". Appellant's Brief, p. 34. However, " [a] tender 
requires that there be a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment 
of the amount of money due, coupled with an actual production of 
the money or its equivalent." Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added). Zoll & Branch has 
never unconditionally offered payment to Mr. Asay of the entire 
amount due him. A deposit of money into court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-4 with instructions to the clerk to hold the 
money until Mr. asay proves his entitlement thereto is not the same 
as a tender. Wash. Nat. Ins. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 670 
(Utah App. 1990); Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 
1990); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) a defendant may 
avoid paying costs where he has tendered payment to the plaintiff 
prior to the commencement of the action, and then deposits the 
money with the court. Rule 68(a) states: 
When in an action for the recovery of 
money only, the defendant alleges in his 
answer that before the commencement of the 
action he tendered to the plaintiff the full 
amount to which the plaintiff was entitled, 
and thereupon deposits in court for the 
plaintiff the amount so tendered, and the 
allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff 
cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to 
the defendant. 
Zoll & Branch's mischaracterization of its deposit as a 
"form of interpleader" is absurd. Interpleader is a form of action 
whereby the plaintiff may join multiple parties as defendants, each 
of whom may have a claim against the plaintiff, in order to protect 
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the plaintiff from double or multiple liability. Utah R. Civ. P. 
22. In the present case there are only two parties to the action, 
Zoll & Branch and Mr. Asay. There was no risk that Zoll & Branch 
could be subject to multiple liability. 
V. THE ATTORNEYSr FEES AWARDED IN THIS CASE ARE REASONABLE. 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). On appeal the court will 
review the trial court's determinations only for a clear abuse of 
discretion. Id.; see also Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 
(Utah 1982); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982). The trial court properly exercised 
its discretion and determined a reasonable attorneys' fee to be 
awarded in the present case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1 
(1969). 
A. The reasonableness of the fees in t h i s case must be 
determined in l i g h t of the a l l fac tors described i n 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and i t s progeny. 
In Appel lant 's Brief , Zoll & Branch c o r r e c t l y descr ibes 
the process by which the reasonableness of an at torneys ' fee should 
be measured, but then ignores t h i s process . Appel lant 's Brief , pp. 
28-30. Zoll & Branch argues that the fee in t h i s case i s e x c e s s i v e 
merely because i t i s "clearly disproportionate to the small amount 
i n i t i a l l y involved." 5 Appel lant's Brief , p. 30. Zoll & Branch's 
5In i t s br ief Zoll & Branch s t a t e s that the amounts of the checks were for 
$1,176.75 and $1,030.00 respec t ive ly , and that the attorneys' fees are over 
$20,000.00. Appel lant's Brief, p. 30. Zoll & Branch's juxtapos i t ion of the 
f igures i s misleading and inaccurate, and exaggerates the claimed d i spar i ty 
between fees and damages in t h i s case . 
( cont inued . . . ) 
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argument ignores the manner by which a court is to judge the 
reasonableness of a fee. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) , 
the Utah Supreme Court explained the process by which a trial court 
should examine the reasonableness of a fee award. The court 
explained that the trial court should find answers to the following 
four questions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Id. at 990. 
In Dixie State Bank, the court further explained that 
[i]n addition, although the amount in 
controversy can be a factor in determining a 
reasonable fee, care should be used in putting 
much reliance on this factor. It is a simple 
fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about 
the same amount of time to collect a note in 
the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a 
note for $100,000. 
Id. See also Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) 
("The amount of damages awarded in a case does not place a 
5(...continued) 
Zoll & Branch's calculations do not accurately represent the damages 
in this case nor the attorneys' fees awarded. The damages awarded to Mr. Asay, 
with interest and penalties, totalled $11,808.89. R. 547-58, U 33. The 
attorneys' fees awarded totalled $12,000.00, plus an additional $1,602.79 in out-
of-pocket expenses. Id. The initial award of attorneys' fees was later 
augmented to include an additional $4,471.86 in fees incurred by Mr. Asay to 
preserve and collect the judgment. R. 649. 
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What legal work was actually performed? 
How much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be 
awarded.") As noted by the Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme 
Court 
" [a]s a general rule, the amounts recoverable 
under the FLSA and the [Utah Payment of Wages 
Act] are so small that attorney fees will 
exceed any potential recovery. Hence, unless 
an award of attorney fees is available, 
workers would be unable to enforce their 
rights under these statutes. 
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 474 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
In the present case, the trial court considered the four 
factors outlined in Dixie State Bank, and determined that the 
attorneys' fees in this case are reasonable. The trial court found 
the following: 
35. The Court has considered all of the 
relevant factors in determining the reason-
ableness of the fees and costs requested by 
Mr. Asay and his attorneys. In this regard 
the testimony of Mr. Asay, who is a licensed 
attorney in this state, was helpful as well as 
the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel, Mr. 
Michael N. Zundel. The Court also observed 
the organized and efficient manner in which 
Mr. Asay's counsel conducted the presentation 
of Mr. Asay's case at trial. All of the 
services provided by Mr. Asay's counsel were 
reasonable and necessary. [Step #2] 
36. The hourly rates charged to Mr. Asay 
by his attorneys, for their time and the time 
of their paralegals are reasonable [Step #3] 
in light of the training, experience and 
expertise of the service providers and as 
measured by the hourly rates customarily 
charged for similar services in the Salt Lake 
City community. 
37. Through November 30, 1992, a total 
of 129.30 hours of legal services were pro-
vided to Mr. Asay by his attorneys in connec-
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tion with Mr. Asay's attempts to recover the 
wages do him from Zoll & Branch. [Step #1] 
The hours of service were necessitated by the 
actions of Zoll & Branch both before and after 
this action was begun, [Step #4] including the 
following actions: 1) failing to pay Mr. Asay 
the wages justly due him, 2) commencing this 
action as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into 
abandoning his legitimate claims against Zoll 
& Branch, 3) refusing to provide discovery as 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and 4) alleging numerous defenses, including 
factually contested offsets, to Mr. Asay's 
claims. 
R. 458-59 (emphasis added). 
The amount of the fees was reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of this case. Zoll & Branch does not present any 
reason to support its contention that the fees are excessive except 
that, based upon its exaggerated and misleading calculations, the 
fees awarded are disproportionate to the amount in controversy. As 
such, Zoll & Branch fails to meet its burden to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in awarding fees as it did, and the 
trial court's award of attorneys' fees must be upheld. 
B. Zoll & Branch was given opportunity to cross-
examine Mr, Asay's counsel regarding the attorneys' 
fees in this case. 
During the trial of this matter, the court was presented 
with the testimony of Mr. Asay, a licensed attorney in this state, 
regarding the reasonableness of the work performed by Mr. Asay's 
counsel. Mr. Asay testified that H. . .1 haven't ever found that 
there's been any overkill or that things have been overdone" and 
that ". . .my opinion is that the charges are reasonable and that 
the services were necessarily provided." R. 956-57. Mr. Asay's 
testimony was unrebutted. 
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The court received the Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel, 
counsel for Mr. Asay, regarding the reasonableness of the fee. 
R. 953-54. The court asked Mr. Zoll whether he would stipulate 
that Mr. Asay's Counsel would testify consistent with its affidavit 
concerning the fees charged. R. 954. Mr. Zoll so stipulated, 
subject to the right of cross-examination. Id. The court then 
granted Zoll & Branch the right to cross-examine Mr. Asay's counsel 
regarding the fees and accepted Mr. Asay's counsel's affidavit into 
evidence. R. 954-55. Thereafter, during the presentation of Zoll 
& Branch's evidence, the court periodically notified Zoll & Branch 
as to the amount of time remaining, and after Zoll & Branch 
exhausted its allotted time, the court allowed Zoll & Branch to use 
substantially more than its allotted time. R. 1014, 1026. After 
having used more time than it was entitled to, Zoll & Branch 
objected that it was not given additional time in which to cross-
examine Mr. Asay's counsel. R. 1125. 
Zoll & Branch now asserts that it had no opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Asay's counsel because the court did not continue 
to grant additional time for Zoll & Branch to do so. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 31. By recognizing Zoll & Branch's right to cross-
examine Mr. Asay's counsel, the trial court does not grant unlimit-
ed time to do so. Zoll & Branch had opportunity to cross-examine 
Mr. Asay's counsel but chose to use its time elsewhere. Zoll & 
Branch's argument that it was not given opportunity to cross-
examine Mr. Asay's counsel is simply false. 
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C. Zoll & Branch waived its right to contest attor-
neys' fees awarded in the Order Augmenting Judgment 
when its counsel exited the courtroom at the com-
mencement of the hearing regarding these fees. 
In addition to the fees awarded to Mr. Asay in the Judg-
ment, Zoll & Branch contests that portion of the fees that were 
awarded at the August 2, 1993 hearing to augment the Judgment. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 32. All attorneys' fees charged by Mr. 
Asay's counsel in this case have been reasonable. Furthermore, any 
objection Zoll & Branch had to the fees awarded at this hearing was 
waived when Zoll & Branch's counsel, Mr. Zoll, walked out of the 
courtroom at the commencement of the hearing and did not return. 
In Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah App. 
1989), the plaintiff appealed, inter alia, on the basis that the 
trial court had awarded less than the full amount of attorney's 
fees sought. In that case the court was presented with the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's attorney and furnished with specific 
details of the time expended in support of the attorney's fees. 
Id. There was no objection raised by defendants to the testimony 
and, in fact, neither the defendants nor their attorneys attended 
the hearing on the fees. Id. Under these circumstances the court 
held that the trial court had abused its discretion in not awarding 
the plaintiff the entire amount of the fee sought without a finding 
that the fee was unreasonable. Id. 
Since the trial court was furnished with specific 
unrebutted evidence of the time spent, the rates charged, and the 
necessity of the work, under Martindale it would have been an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to award Mr. Asay less than the 
41 
full amount of the fees in question in the motion to augment the 
judgment. Zoll & Branch did not object to the evidence, and has 
not created any record whatsoever to show that the fees were exces-
sive. The court's findings are supported by the evidence, and do 
not show an abuse of discretion. 
D. Any disparity between fees in this case and the 
amount in controversy is attributable to Zoll & 
Branch, who cannot now complain that its own 
actions increased the cost of litigating this case. 
Zoll & Branch accuses the trial court of simply granting 
Mr. Asay's motion to augment the attorneys' fees awarded in this 
case without examining the supporting affidavits. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 32. In support of its argument it quotes the record 
where the court granted Mr. Asay's Motion to Augment after Zoll & 
Branch's counsel prematurely exited the courtroom. Id. However, 
the court's language immediately following the portion quoted by 
Zoll & Branch is enlightening as to the justification for the 
amount of attorneys' fees expended in this case. After receiving 
the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel and hearing the evidence 
regarding the fees, the court stated: 
Your request will be granted. The 
judgment is to be augmented in the amount of 
$4,461.86 as additional fees and costs. 
Further to what you indicated, I think 
that Mr. Zoll's conduct towards the court, who 
quite obviously is not an adversary in this 
matter, probably reflects upon the additional 
fees caused by the way he handled this matter. 
And if he had handled the matter in a 
more professional manner, that the amount of 
fees that have been accrued would not have 
been accrued, and I believe that was part of 
your theory in the first place. 
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R. 1158 (emphasis added). 
Zoll & Branch's tactics have added to the expense of this 
litigation and are exemplified by Mr. Zoll's repeated refusals to 
attend or submit to scheduled depositions. In an attempt to 
schedule Mr. Zoll's deposition, Mr. Asay's counsel sent Mr. Zoll a 
letter listing 8 days that were acceptable and requesting that Mr. 
Zoll notify Mr. Asay's counsel as to which time would be 
preferable. R. 77. The letter stated that if Mr. Zoll failed to 
respond the deposition would be scheduled on a specified date. Id. 
Because Mr. Zoll did not respond, the deposition was scheduled and 
Mr. Zoll was notified of the time and place approximately three 
weeks in advance. Id. Pursuant to requests from Mr. Zoll the 
deposition was rescheduled twice. Id. Finally Mr. Asay's counsel 
had a subpoena issued ordering Mr. Zoll to appear at the scheduled 
time. Id. On the morning of the scheduled deposition, Mr. Zoll 
called to inform Mr. Asay's counsel that he would attend but was 
running late. Id. Mr. Zoll appeared at the deposition 40 minutes 
late, proffered a statement listing the excuses why he could not 
continue, and began to leave. Id. Mr. Asay's counsel attempted 
to question Mr. Zoll regarding his statement, but Mr. Zoll 
interrupted him and stated: 
You don't have anything to say. 
(To the reporter) Give me a copy of the 
information that's been given. 
And I'll see you another date or your 
motion to compel, [sic] Whatever you have — 
Whatever rights you have you can, of course, 
exercise those. Thank you gentlemen — I mean 
Mister and Ms. 
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R. 11. Mr. Zoll then abruptly left the proceeding, as he later did 
at the hearing to augment fees. Id. 
In Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 985, the court recog-
nized that a party should not be allowed to use tactics to increase 
the costs of litigation and then contest an award of attorneys' 
fees on the basis that they are excessive in light of the amount in 
controversy. In the present case, the trial court recognized Zoll 
& Branch's tactics for what they were, i.e., "an attempt to pres-
sure Mr. Asay into abandoning his legitimate claims." R. 459, 
U 37. Through its own dilatory and frivolous tactics, Zoll & 
Branch has increased the cost of litigating this matter. Zoll & 
Branch's unsupported claim that the fees in this case are excessive 
is not grounds to overturn the trial court's finding that the fees 
are reasonable. 
VI. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY RULE 62(d) SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
POSTED IN THIS CASE. THE RULE 62(b) BOND THAT WAS POSTED 
WAS PROPERLY RELEASED TO MR. ASAY. 
In its statement of the case, Zoll & Branch alludes to 
alleged impropriety on the part of the trial court and counsel for 
Mr. Asay by stating that "the trial court judge improperly violated 
a stay of execution on the supersedeas bond" and allowed "Respon-
dent Asay to make an ex parte motion". Appellant's Brief, p. 7. 
Although Zoll & Branch does not address the statement further in 
its brief, Asay will address the matter here. 
Zoll & Branch's contention that the trial court acted 
inappropriately centers around its assertion that a "supersedeas 
bond" was improperly released to Asay. Id. In support of its 
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assertion, Zoll & Branch relies on the trial court's Order Granting 
Zoll & Branch's Motion for a Stay of Execution and releasing 
Garnishment (the "Stay"), A copy of the Stay is attached hereto at 
Addendum Item No. 6. The Stay states: 
ORDERED, that upon compliance with all of 
the provisions of this Order by Zoll & Branch, 
all proceedings and actions to enforce or 
collect the judgment entered in this case in 
favor of Alan Asay shall be stayed until May 
25, 1993 (8 weeks and 30 days after February 
23,1993), or until thirty days after Zoll & 
Branch's motion for a new trial and motion to 
alter or amend judgment are heard and decided 
by this Court, whichever first occurs; 
R. 526. (emphasis added). 
The Stay was granted pursuant to Rule 62(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Stay, p. 1 R. 525-27. In contrast to sub-
section (d) (pertaining to supersedeas bond), subsection (b), 
allows the court to stay the execution of a judgment pending the 
disposition of the following motions: 1) a motion for a new trial 
or to alter or amend judgment; 2) a motion for relief from judgment 
or order; 3) a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict; or 4) a motion for amendment to the findings or 
for additional findings. By its express terms, the Stay expired 
upon the earlier of 25 May 1993 or 30 days after Zoll & Branch's 
motion for a new trial and motion to alter or amend judgement were 
heard and decided by the court. Zoll & Branch has persistently 
maintained that its security was posted as a supersedeas bond 
because "TENDER AS SUPERSEDIOUS [sic] /SECURITY BOND" was typed on 
the certificate of deposit receipt submitted to the court, despite 
the court's rejection of Zoll & Branch's position. R. 515. 
45 
On 25 May 1993, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, 
the court signed an Order Allowing Extension of Bond Expiration 
Date (the "First Extension") that postponed expiration of the bond 
until 25 June 1993. R. 596-97. A copy of the First Extension is 
attached hereto at Addendum Item No. 6. The First Extension did 
not in any way alter the nature of the security, and expressly 
stated that the bond would expire on 25 June 1993. Id. 
The stay was further extended by the court's order dated 
23 June 1993 (the "Second Extension") because the court's file on 
this case had been lost. R. 617-18. A copy of the Second Exten-
sion is attached hereto at Addendum Item No. 6. By the express 
terms of the Second Extension, the stay was extended until the 
court's file could be found and until Zoll & Branch's Motion for a 
New Trial could be ruled upon. Id. The court's file was located 
and the Motion for a New Trial was denied on 20 July 1993, thereby 
terminating the stay and all extensions. R. 632-33. 
On 2 August 1993, the court properly recognized that no 
stay was in effect and released the cash held by the court clerk to 
Mr. Asay in partial satisfaction of the judgment in Mr. Asay's 
favor. As noted, at this time the Stay, the First Extension and 
the Second Extension had by their own express terms expired. 
Zoll & Branch's allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the trial court and Mr. Asay's counsel are entirely without justi-
fication, and are absolutely chimerical. Throughout this matter, 
Mr. Asay's counsel has carefully followed all court procedures and 
rules despite Zoll & Branch's insistence on ignoring court deter-
46 
minations, rules, and decorum, and persistent attempts to falsify 
the record by, inter alia, asserting the existence of a supersedeas 
bond with no good faith basis when in fact no supersedeas bond 
existed. 
VTI. MR. ASAY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS COSTS ON APPEAL, 
INCLUDING AN AWARD FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
A. Mr. As ay is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees 
under Utah Code Ann. S 34-27-1 (1988). 
Under Utah law, attorneys' fees may generally only be 
recovered where provided for by contract or statute. E.g., Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988. 
"The general rule is that when a party who received 
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled 
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept. of Social Ser-
vices v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991); Brown v. 
Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992). Where a contract 
provides a basis for awarding attorneys' fees, the courts have 
consistently held that such a provision includes attorneys' fees 
incurred for the appeal of the matter. See, e.g. , Management Ser-
vices v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980); 
Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 713 (Utah'1981); Edward's 
Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889, 890 (Utah 1982). In Martin-
dale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989) this court appli-
ed the general rule to award attorney fees on appeal where the 
plaintiff had been awarded fees at trial pursuant to the mechanics 
lien statute. In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990), the court stated that where fees are awarded in divorce 
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actions pursuant to statute, fees should also ordinarily be awarded 
on appeal. 
In the present case, Mr, Asay's award of attorneys' fees 
is based on Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. Therefore, Mr. Asay is en-
titled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees which he has incurred 
in order to defend the judgment on appeal. 
B. Zoll & Branch's appeal is frivolous. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) provides that the 
court shall award just damages to the prevailing party, which may 
include single or double costs and attorney fees, where the court 
determines that an appeal is frivolous. An appeal is frivolous if 
it is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse exist-
ing law. Utah R. App. P. 33(b). See also, e.g. , O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987) (A frivolous appeal is one with-
out a reasonable legal or factual basis). In Utah Dept of Social 
Services v. Adams, supra, this court held that "an appeal brought 
from an action which is properly determined to be in bad faith is 
necessarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33." 806 P.2d at 1197. 
The trial court expressly found that this action was 
commenced as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning his 
legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch. R. 459. Zoll & Branch's 
action was therefore brought in bad faith, and this appeal is 
frivolous. Zoll & Branch's appeal is not grounded in fact nor 
warranted by existing law, and contains no good faith argument to 
extend, modify or reverse existing law. Mr. Asay is therefore 
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entitled to recover his costs incurred on appeal, including reason-
able attorneys' fees from Zoll & Branch and its counsel, B. Ray 
Zoll, personally. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout its brief Zoll & Branch misrepresents and 
distort's the record of this case in order to disguise itself as a 
legitimate employer victimized by a "total miscarriage of justice." 
Zoll & Branch handed checks to Mr. Asay upon his final departure 
from the firm to pay his wages and to purchase Mr. Asay's computer 
system. After Mr. Asay had left the firm, Zoll & Branch stopped 
payment on the checks. When confronted by Mr. Asay, Zoll & Branch 
filed this action as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning 
his legitimate claims against them. Utah's wage statutes, and the 
penalties provided therein, are designed to protect employees 
against these types of tactics. 
The burden on the appellant in this case is to show that 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing a new trial, and 
it has fallen far short of carrying that burden. Zoll & Branch has 
not marshaled the evidence and shown that the trial court's find-
ings are clearly erroneous. In fact, the credible evidence in this 
case supports the trial court's findings. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in 
managing the trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 611, or making evidentiary 
rulings. 
Nor does the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 
provide any basis for a new trial; in fact, section 34-28-5 is 
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intended to address precisely this type of factual situation. See 
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 471-72. 
The trial court awarded unpaid wages, statutory penal-
ties, and attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1, the wage 
payment statute's "mandatory attorney fee provision, which requires 
the court to grant a successful plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee 
. . . ." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 469. Moreover, the trial 
courts findings on the reasonableness and amount of the fees are 
not clearly erroneous. 
This appeal is the latest episode in a nearly five-year 
effort by Zoll & Branch to "to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning 
his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch." Such harassment 
should not be tolerated. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of February, 1994. 
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
A Professional Corporation 
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voluntarily leaving the service of any person, com-
pany or corporation with intent and for the purpose of 
preventing such employee from engaging in or secur-
ing similar or other employment from any other per-
son, company or corporation. 1969 
34-24-2. Violation — Penalty. 
If any person blacklists or publishes, or causes to be 
blacklisted or published, any employee discharged by 
any corporation, company or individual, with the in-
tent and for the purpose of preventing such employee 
from engaging in or securing similar or other employ-
ment from any other corporation, company or individ-
ual, or shall in any manner conspire or contrive by 
correspondence or otherwise to prevent such dis-
charged employee from securing employment, such 
person is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less 
than $55 nor more than $1000 and imprisoned in the 
state prison not less than sixty days nor more than 
one year. 1969 
CHAPTER 25 
FELLOW SERVANTS 
Section 
34-25-1. "Vice-principal" defined. 
34-25-2. "Fellow servant" defined. 
34-25-1. "Vice-principal" defined. 
All persons engaged in the service of any person 
and entrusted by such employer with authority of su-
perintendence, control or command of other persons 
in the employ or service of such employer, or with 
authority to direct any other employee in the perfor-
mance of any duties of such employee, are vice-princi-
pals of such employer, and are not fellow servants. 
1969 
34-25-2. "Fellow servant" defined. 
All persons who are engaged in the service of any 
employer and who while so engaged are in the same 
grade of service and are working together at the same 
time and place and to a common purpose, neither of 
such persons being entrusted by such employer with 
any superintendence or control over his fellow em-
ployees, are fellow servants with each other; but 
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to 
make the employees of such employer fellow servants 
with other employees engaged in any other depart-
ment of service of such employer. Employees who do 
not come within the provisions of this section shall 
not be considered fellow servants. 1969 
CHAPTER 26 
WAGES A PREFERRED DEBT 
Section 
34-26-1. Extent and condition of preference. 
34-26-2. Claim — Notice. 
34-26-3. Claim — Exceptions — Contest. 
34-26-4. "Wages" defined. 
34-26-1. Extent and condition of preference. 
If any property of any person is seized through any 
process of any court, or when his business is sus-
pended by the act of creditors or is put into the hands 
of a receiver, assignee, or trustee, either by voluntary 
or involuntary action, the amount owing to workmen, 
clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or servants, for 
work or labor performed within five months next pre-
ceding the seizure or transfer of the property shall be 
considered and treated as preferred debts, and the 
workmen, clerks, traveling and city salesmen, and 
servants shall be preferred creditors, the first to be 
paid in full. If there are not sufficient proceeds to pay 
them in full, then the proceeds shall be paid to them 
pro rata, after paying costs. No officer, director, or 
general manager of a corporation employer or any 
member of an association employer or partner of a 
partnership employer is entitled to this preference. 
1987 
34-26-2. Claim — Notice. 
Any such employee, laborer or servant desiring to 
enforce his claim for wages under this chapter shall 
present a statement under oath to the officer, person 
or court charged with such property within ten days 
after the seizure of it on any process, or within thirty 
days after the same may have been placed in the 
hands of any receiver, assignee or trustee, showing 
the amount due after allowing all just credits and 
setoffs, the kind of work for which such wages are due 
and when performed. Any person with whom any 
such claim shall have been filed shall give immediate 
notice thereof by mail to all persons interested, and, if 
the claim is not contested as provided in Section 
34-26-3, it shall be the duty of the person or the court 
receiving such statement to pay the amount of such 
claim or claims to the person or persons entitled 
thereto, after first paying all costs occasioned by the 
seizure of such property, out of the proceeds of the 
sale of the property seized. 1969 
34-26-3. Claim — Exceptions — Contest 
Any person interested may within ten days after 
the notice of presentment of said statement contest 
such claims, or any part of them, by filing exceptions 
to them supported by affidavit with the officer or 
court having the custody of such property, and there-
upon the claimant shall be required to reduce his 
claim to judgment in some court having jurisdiction 
before any part thereof shall be paid. The person con-
testing shall be made a party defendant in any such 
action and shall have the right to contest such claim, 
and the prevailing party shall recover proper costs. 
1969 
34-26-4. "Wages" defined. 
Whenever used in this chapter, "wages" shall mean 
all amounts due the employee for labor or services, 
whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, 
task, piece, commission basis or other method of cal-
culating such amount. 1969 
s/ CHAPTER 27 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES 
Section 
34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs. 
34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs. 
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, ser-
vant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit 
for wages earned and due according to the terms of 
his employment and shall establish by the decision of 
the court that the amount for which he has brought 
suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made 
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was 
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found 
due, then it shall be the duty of the court before 
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount 
found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969 
CHAPTER 28 
PAYMENT OF WAGES 
Section 
34-28-1. Public and certain other employments 
excepted. 
34-28-2. Definitions. 
34-28-3. Regular paydays — Currency or nego-
tiable checks required — Deposit in 
financial institution — Statement of 
total deductions. 
34-28-4. Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a 
misdemeanor. 
34-28-5. Separation from payroll — Resignation 
— Suspension because of industrial 
dispute. 
34-28-6. Dispute over wages — Notice and pay-
ment. 
34-28-7. Payment at more frequent intervals per-
mitted — Agreements to contravene 
act prohibited. 
34-28-8. Subcontractors — Compliance with act. 
34-28-9. Enforcement of chapter. 
34-28-10. Employers' records — Inspection by 
commission. 
34-28-11. Commission may employ assistants. 
34-28-12. Violations — Misdemeanor. 
34-28-13. Assignment of wage claims — Powers of 
commission — Award of attorneys' 
fees. 
34-28-14. Actions by commission as assignee — 
Costs need not be advanced. 
34-28-15 to 34-28-18. Repealed. 
34-28-1. Public and certain other employments 
excepted. 
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to 
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town, 
or other political subdivision, or to employers and em-
ployees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticul-
tural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry 
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any 
other employment where an agreement exists be-
tween employer and employee providing for different 
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section 
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees en-
gaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horti-
cultural or stock or poultry raising. 1973 
34-28-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) The word "employer" includes every person, 
firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver 
or other officer of a court of this state, and any 
agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned 
classes, employing any person in this state. 
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the 
employee for labor or services, whether the amount 
is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, com-
mission basis or other method of calculating such 
amount. 1969 
34-28-3. Regular paydays — Currency or nego-
tiable checks required — Deposit in fi-
nancial institution — Statement of 
total deductions. 
Every employer shall pay to his employees the 
wages earned semimonthly or twice during each cal-
endar month on days to be designated in advance by 
the employer as the regular payday; provided, that 
the employer shall pay for services rendered during 
each semimonthly period within ten days after the 
close of such period; provided, that when the semi-
monthly payday shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or 
legal holiday, payment of wages earned during the 
semimonthly period shall be made on the day preced-
ing such Saturday or Sunday, or legal holiday. When-
ever the employer hires his employees on a yearly 
salary basis, then the employer may pay the em-
ployee on a monthly scale, the wages shall be paid by 
the seventh of the month following the month for 
which services were rendered. He shall pay such 
wages in full, in lawful money of the United States, 
or checks on banks convertible into cash on demand 
at full face value thereof. 
No person, firm or corporation or agent, or officer 
shall issue in payment of wages due or to become due 
or as an advance on wages to be earned for services 
performed or to be performed within this state any 
order, check or draft, unless it is negotiable and pay-
able in cash, on demand, without discount, at a bank, 
the name and address of which must appear on the 
instrument. 
If an employee voluntarily authorizes an employer 
to deposit wages due or to become due, or an advance 
on wages to be earned, in a bank, savings and loan 
association, credit union or other financial institution 
in the State of Utah, the employer may so deposit 
until the authorization is terminated. 
If any deduction is made from the wages paid, the 
employer shall, either semimonthly or monthly at the 
employer's option, furnish the employee with a state-
ment showing the total amount of each deduction, 
provided that only one total need be shown to include 
all standing deductions of fixed amounts, unless oth-
erwise agreed by employer and employee. 1977 
34-28-4. Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a 
misdemeanor. 
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to notify 
his employees at the time of hiring of the day and 
place of payment, of the rate of pay, and of any 
change with respect to any of these items prior to the 
time of the change. Alternatively, however, every em-
ployer shall have the option of giving such notifica-
tion by posting these facts and keeping them posted 
conspicuously at or near the place of work where such 
posted notice can be seen by each employee as he 
comes or goes to his place of work. 
(2) Failure to post and to keep posted any notice or 
failure to give notice as prescribed in this section 
shall be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable as 
SUCh. 1969 
34-28-5. Separation from payroll — Resignation 
— Suspension because of industrial 
dispute. 
(1) Whenever an employer separates an employee 
from his payroll, the unpaid wages of such employee 
shall become due immediately, and the employer 
shall pay such wages to the employee within 24 hours 
of the time of separation at the specified place of pay-
ment. 
In case of failure to pay wages due an employee 
within 24 hours of a demand therefor, the wages of 
such employee shall continue from the date of separa-
tion until paid, but in no event to exceed sixty days, 
at the same rate which the employee received at the 
time of separation. The employee may recover the 
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil action. This 
action must be commenced within sixty days from the 
date of separation. Any employee who has not made a 
demand for payment shall not be entitled to any such 
penalty under this subsection. 
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(2) Whenever an employee (not having a written 
contract for a definite period) quits or resigns his em-
ployment, the wages earned shall become due and 
payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless 
such employee shall have given 72 hours' previous 
notice of his intention to quit, in which latter case 
such employee shall receive his wages at the specified 
place of payment at the time of quitting. 
(3) In the event of the suspension of work as the 
resu l t of an indus t r ia l dispute, the wages ea rned and 
unpa id a t t he t ime of th is suspension shall become 
due and payable a t the next r egu la r payday, as pro-
vided in Section 34-28-3, including wi thout abate-
m e n t or reduct ion all amoun t s due all persons whose 
work has been suspended as a resu l t of such indus-
t r ia l dispute , toge ther wi th any deposit or o ther guar-
an ty held by the employer for the faithful perfor-
mance of the dut ies of the employment . 1969 
34-28-6. D i s p u t e o v e r w a g e s — Not i ce a n d pay-
ment. 
In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall 
give written notice to the employee of the amount of 
wages which he concedes to be due and shall pay such 
amount without condition within the time set by this 
chapter; but acceptance by the employee of any such 
payment made shall not constitute a release as to the 
balance of his claim. 1969 
34-28-7. Payment at more frequent intervals 
permitted — Agreements to contra-
vene act prohibited. 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way 
limit or prohibit the payment of wages or compensa-
tion at more frequent intervals, or in greater 
amounts or in full when or before due, but no provi-
sions of this act can in any way be contravened or set 
aside by a mutual agreement. 1969 
34-28-8. Subcontractors — Compliance with 
act. 
Whenever any person shall contract with another 
for the performance of work, then it shall be the duty 
of such person to provide in the contract that all 
wages earned pursuant to the contract shall be paid 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and 
in the event that any wages earned under the con-
tract shall not be paid as required in this act, such 
person shall be civilly liable for all wages for work 
performed under such contract in the same manner 
as if the employees entitled to such wages were di-
rectly employed by such person. 1969 
34-28-9. Enforcement of chapter. 
(1) (a) The Industrial Commission shall ensure 
compliance with this chapter, investigate any al-
leged violations of this chapter, and determine 
the validity of any claim for any violation of this 
chapter filed with it by an employee. 
(b) The amount of $50 constitutes the mini-
mum wage claim that the commission may ac-
cept. 
(2) (a) An abstract of any final award may be filed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of 
any county in the state. If so filed, it shall be 
docketed in the judgment docket of that district 
court. 
(b) The time of the receipt of the abstract shall 
be noted by the clerk and entered in the judg-
ment docket. 
(c) If filed and docketed, the award constitutes 
a lien from the time of the docketing upon the 
rpal nronertv of the employer situated in the 
county, for a period of eight years from the date 
of the award unless previously satisfied 
(d) Execution may be issued on the award 
within the same time and in the same manner 
and with the same effect as if the award were a 
judgment of the district court. 
(3) (a) The county attorney for the county in which 
the plaintiff or the defendant resides, depending 
on the district in which the final award is dock-
eted, shall represent the commission on all ap-
peals and shall enforce judgments. 
(b) The county shall be awarded reasonable at-
torney's fees, as specified by the Industrial Com-
mission, and costs for: 
(i) appeals where the plaintiff prevails; and 
(ii) for judgment enforcement proceedings. 
(4) (a) The Industrial Commission may enter into 
reciprocal agreements with the labor department 
or corresponding agency of any other state or 
with the person, board, officer, or commission au-
thorized to act on behalf of that department or 
agency, for the collection in any other state of 
claims or judgments for wages and other de-
mands based upon claims previously assigned to 
the Industrial Commission. 
(b) The Industrial Commission may, to the ex-
tent provided for by any reciprocal agreement en-
tered into under Section 34-38-9, or by the laws 
of any other state, maintain actions in the courts 
of the other states for the collection of any claims 
for wages, judgments, and other demands and 
may assign the claims, judgments, and demands 
to the labor department or agency of any other 
state for collection to the extent that may be per-
mitted or provided for by the laws of that state or 
by reciprocal agreement. 
(c) The Industrial Commission may, upon the 
written request of the labor department or other 
corresponding agency of any other state or of any 
person, board, officer, or commission of that state 
authorized to act on behalf of the labor depart-
ment or corresponding agency, maintain actions 
in the courts of this state upon assigned claims 
for wages, judgments, and demands arising in 
any other state in the same manner and to the 
same extent that the actions by the Industrial 
Commission are authorized when arising in this 
state. However, these actions may be commenced 
and maintained only where the other state by 
legislation or reciprocal agreement has extended 
the same comity to this state. 1987 
34-28-10. Employers' records — Inspection by 
commission. 
(1) (a) Every employer shall keep a true and accu-
rate record of time worked and wages paid each 
pay period to each employee who is employed on 
an hourly or a daily basis in the form required by 
the Industrial Commission's rules. 
(b) The employer shall keep the records on file 
for at least one year after the entry of the record. 
(2) The Industrial Commission and its authorized 
representatives may enter any place of employment 
during business hours to inspect the records and to 
ensure compliance with this section. 
(3) Any effort of any employer to obstruct the In-
dustrial Commission and its authorized representa-
tives in the performance of their duties is considered 
to be a violation of this chapter and may be punished 
as any other violation of this chapter. 1987 
34-28-11. Commission may employ assistants. 
The Industrial Commission, pursuant to the law of 
68-3-2 STATUTES 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Desuetude, Due Pro-
cess, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992 
Utah L. Rev. 449. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Inter-
preting Statutes Faithfully — Not Dynami-
cally, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1353. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489; 
C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
88-2-2. 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Decisions of foreign courts. 
Garnishment proceedings. 
Inheritance laws. 
Liability of city. 
Life insurance. 
Penal statutes. 
Questions of novel impression. 
Remedial statutes. 
Rules of equity prevail. 
—Forfeitures. 
Statutes of foreign states. 
Worker's compensation. 
Cited. 
In general. 
This section is mandatory. Hammond v. 
Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918). 
This section abrogates the common-law rule. 
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 
(1906); State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 432, 226 P. 
904 (1924). 
When a statute charges one with a duty or 
imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so 
with sufficient clarity that one of ordinary in-
telligence will understand what he is required 
to do, and, in case of alternative choices, he can 
comply by selecting the one least burdensome 
to him. Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 
P.2d 943 (1959). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common 
Law ^ 13 to 18. 
C.J.S. — 15A C.J.S. Common Law ^ n t 13 
to 15. 
Key Numbers. — Common Law o=» 12. 
Cross-References. — One form of civil ac-
tion; law and equity administered in same ac-
tion, Rule 2, U.R.C.P. 
Statutes are to be liberally construed to give 
effect to their purpose and promote justice but 
they are not to be distorted beyond the intent 
of the legislature. Stanton Transp. Co. v. 
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Requirement in this section that provisions 
of statutes and proceedings under them be lib-
erally construed with view to effect statutes' 
objects and to promote justice applies, at least 
in matter of amendment of pleading, as well 
when it is statutes of another state, as when it 
is statutes of Utah, that are involved. Pugmire 
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 
P. 385 (1903) (decided under prior law). 
In action for wrongful death erroneously 
commenced by intestate's widow and children, 
who were only parties in interest, instead of 
properly by personal representative, it was 
error for trial court not to allow complaint to be 
amended so as to substitute, as plaintiff, widow 
in her capacity as administratrix. Pugmire v. 
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P. 
385 (1903) (decided under prior law). 
Decisions of foreign courts. 
Decisions of courts of other states under stat-
utes differing from those of Utah are not con-
trolling, it being duty of Utah courts to con-
strue statutes of own state and give them such 
effect as the Legislature intended, reasoning 
from the language used and the purpose in 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally 
construed — Rules of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
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78-1-2.4. Number of circuit judges — Replacement author-
ity. 
(1) Subject to changes due to the reallocation or elimination of circuit court 
positions under Section 20-1-7.6, the number of circuit court judges shall be: 
(a) two circuit judges in the First District; 
(b) seven circuit judges in the Second District; 
(c) ten circuit judges in the Third District; and 
(d) three circuit judges in the Fourth District. 
(2) On January 1, 1992, the district court and circuit court in the Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts are merged into one court. The successor 
court shall be the district court and shall be located in those municipalities 
where the district courts currently are located. Judges of the successor court 
in these judicial districts shall be district court judges as of that date. Judges 
of these districts shall stand for unopposed retention election as required by 
law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-1-2.4, enacted by L. (2), substituted "district court and circuit 
1988, ch. 115, § 6; 1991, ch. 268, § 21; 1991 court" for "circuit courts" and "merged into one 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 7, § 4; 1993, ch. 59, § 5. court" for "established as" in the first sentence 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- and rewrote the last three sentences by provid-
ment, effective March 12, 1993, in Subsection i n g for SUCcessor courts; deleted former Subsec-
(1), added the language beginning "Subject"
 t i o n (3)? ending the authority to replace a va-
and continuing to "Section 20-1-7.6" at the be-
 c a n t c i r c u i t C0Urt judicial position with a court 
ginning of the introductory language and sub-
 c o m m i s s i o n e r p o s i t i o n i n 1 9 9 6 ; a n d m a d e s t 
stituted specific numbers for ranges of num- Hstic changes 
bers throughout the subsection; in Subsection 
CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Section 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
4 
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(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. (4), deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, which read: "general water adjudication" and 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, "taxation and revenue; and," respectively, 
§ 11. making related changes; redesignated former 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- Subsection (g) as Subsection (e); and made sty-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, in Subsection listic changes in Subsection (e). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992). 
Appellate jurisdiction. Certiorari. 
— Formal adjudicative proceedings.
 W h e n exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
Certiorari. granted by this section, the Supreme Court re-
Cited, views the decision of the Court of Appeals, not 
A li * • • H* *' ° ^ t n e tr*a* c o u r t» therefore, the briefs of the 
p p J
 * parties should address the decision of the Court 
•—Formal adjudicative proceedings. of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Subdivision (3)(e)(iii) confers jurisdiction in Butterfield v. Okubo, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and (1992). 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative Cited in State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv. 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah Rep. 8 (1991). 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of at torney's fees. 
(a) D a m a g e s for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b> Defini t ions . For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures . 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
to make express the authority of the court to 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
—Defined. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relat-
ing to alimony and distribution of marital 
Property was frivolous, where there was no ba-
S1s for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was mischaracterized and mis-
stated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he in-
vestigated plaintiff's malpractice action 
gainst defendant orthodontist and found that 
n e
 could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. 
O'Brien v Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Tab 3 
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or 
prejudice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan- Cross-References. — Separate trial autho-
tially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P. rized, U.R.C.P. 42(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Insurer 
ANALYSIS CO. V. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 
(1957). 
_ .
 A ,. . ~ . r- r —Personal injury action. 
-Declaratory action as to effect of policy. Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur-
—-Personal injury action. ance company as a party defendant in a per-
Cited. sonal injury action, based on insurance policy 
Insurer. providing that the insurance company "has 
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim 
—Declaratory action as to effect of policy. has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not 
One who claims to be damaged by the negli- come within the joinder provision of either 
gent act of another is not a proper party to an Rule 18(b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20 
action by the insurer of the latter under a pub- Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
lie liability policy, whereby a declaratory judg- Cited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 
ment is sought declaring the legal effect of the P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 92 Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 13 to 16, 24 to 
et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 12. 27; Trial &* 3, 4. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 33 to 55; 88 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 7 to 10. 
Rule 21. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be 
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own 
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim 
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 21, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Sole owner of dissolved corporation. 
Added Darties Trial court had discretion to allow individual 
Service of process w ^ ° w a s so*e o w n e r °f corporate stock and 
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation. grantee of land in question to join as plaintiff 
Severance. m action brought by corporation to quiet tax 
A , i , ,. title to land where corporation had been dis-
* solved prior to suit. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. 
—Service of process. Bowers, 16 Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (1965). 
Even though sons were necessary parties 
and in court during the trial, the court could Severance. 
not make the sons parties defendant without Severance is within the sound discretion of 
service of summons or other process. Monroe the trial court and, absent abuse of such discre-
City v. Arnold, 22 Utah 2d 291, 452 P.2d 321 tion, will not be upset on appeal. King v. Bar-
(1969). ron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 139 et seq. 
§§ 259 to 278. Key Numbers. — Parties «=> 77 to 92. 
Rule 22. Interpleader. 
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and 
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may 
be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objecting to the 
joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their 
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are 
adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he 
is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant 
Rule 23 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE bU 
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-
claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in 
any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical 
to Rule 22(1), F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Function of interpleader. 
Attorney fees ^ n e ^ u n c ^ o n °f a n interpleader is to compel 
r) e n ial conflicting complainants to litigate their 
Escrow claims among themselves. Maycock v. Conti-
Failure to interplead. n e n t a l L i f e I n s - C o - 7 9 U t a h 2 4 8 > 9 P 2 d 1 7 9 
—Insurer. (1932). 
Function of interpleader. A n a c t i o n i n interpleader is a proceeding in 
Taxation equity in which a person who has possession of 
Termination. money or property which may be owned or 
D e c j s j o n on all issues. claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of 
liability, or possible multiple liability, by dis-
rney ees. claiming his interest and submitting the mat-
—Denial. ter of ownership for adjudication by the court. 
If a party bringing an action has, through Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29 
his own fault, caused the conflicting claims ne- (Utah 1980). 
cessitating interpleader, it is proper to deny his 
attorney's fees. Capson v. Brisbois, 592 P.2d Taxation. 
583 (Utah 1979). Complaint by taxpayer to compel two coun-
ties to interplead as to which was entitled to 
scrow. , , . u i _ - I J U tax as result of apportionment by State Tax 
Interpleader statute could be invoked by a
 C o m m i s s i o n w a s £ l d i n s u f f l c i e n t S e e Union 
person holding stock m escrow^ Walker v. ^
 Q 
Bamberger, 17 Utah 239, 54 P.2d 108 (1898).
 p 4 g 3 (1 9 1g) 
Failure to interplead. 
Termination. 
—Insurer. 
Failure of an insurer to bring an action in —Decision on all issues. 
interpleader did not constitute an unreason- If the action in interpleader accomplishes 
able delay on its part in making payment un- the purpose for which the plaintiff instituted it, 
der a policy, so as to justify a judgment against it is not necessarily a requisite to its termina-
such company for interest. Maycock v. Conti- tion that it decide all of the issues between the 
nental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 adverse claimants. Terry's Sales, Inc. v. 
(1932). Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader tion in absence of contract or statute fixing 
§ 29 et seq. amount, 57 A.L.R.3d 475. 
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 11. Key Numbers. — Interpleader <s=> 14. 
A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-
Rule 23. Class actions. 
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) 
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class. 
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co , 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P 2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial <®=> 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
——Conclusions of law. 
——Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
——Findings of facts by jury. 
——Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
—Ultimate facts. 
Summary judgment. 
—Statement of grounds. 
Waiver. 
—Failure of court. 
When filed. 
—Tardy filing. 
Cited. 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
In a contract action by a real estate broker 
for his commission, where the defendant raises 
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his 
answer, the court should make findings on the 
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on all material issues 
is reversible error where it is prejudicial. 
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 
P.2d 284 (1954). 
—Advisory verdict. 
The trial court has the responsibility to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury. 
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 
392 (Utah 1980).' 
—Breach of contract. 
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of con-
tract, requested finding by court on material 
issue as to whether the foundation of their 
house had been located in accordance with zon-
ing ordinances and restrictive covenants, it 
was the duty of the court to make such a find-
ing. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
Tab 4 
ARTICLE I. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and 
with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Adapted Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in 
from Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence courts of the state including situations previ-
(1974). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing ously governed by statute, except to the extent 
with preliminary questions of fact, grand jury that specific statutory provisions are expressly 
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-ju- retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes, 
dicial proceedings and summary contempt pro-
 3 0 U t a h 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the 
ceedings. Rule 101 and 1101 are comparable to
 e x t e n t t h a t i t p e r mits ad hoc development of 
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
 i f t l ^ o f c o u r t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s e 
except that Rule 2 made applicable other pro-
 R u l e g o f E v i d e n c e 
cedural rules (i.e., civil/criminal) or applicable mU ... r , u , . 0 , , n 
, , , , ,i , . ,
 u . ., ! X r> i The position of the court in State v. Hansen, 
statutes to the extent that they relax the Rules r 0 0 D o j i ^ a u , i n ^ a ± ± ± * 
of Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah 5 8 8 P 2* 164 (Utah 1978) that statutory provi-
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly made the S1°™ of evidence law inconsistent with the 
rules applicable to both civil and criminal pro- r u l e s w l U t a k e Precedence is rejected, 
ceedings Cross-References. — Evidence generally, 
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the § 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bail hearings. Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap- 1977). 
plicable to and controlling at bail hearings. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Ju-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68. dicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987 67. 
Utah L. Rev. 467. 
Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration 
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional 
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain 
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Cross-References. — Harmless error in ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61, 
U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability. 
Bench trial. 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
—Exclusion. 
—Harmless error. 
—Objection. 
—Offer of proof. 
—Substantial right or prejudice. 
—Waiver. 
Plain error. 
Purpose. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plain-
tiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant 
where the trial court's exclusion of the testi-
mony was a case management decision and the 
substance of the testimony had no bearing on 
the court's decision, because the exclusion of 
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett 
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
Bench trial. 
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on 
evidence are not of such critical moment as 
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be 
assumed that the court has, and will use, its 
superior knowledge as to competency and the 
effect which should be given evidence. Super 
Tire Mkt , Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 
P.2d 132 (1966). 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
Even if refusal to admit photographs was 
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where 
the evidence was cumulative and could have 
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v. 
Provo City Corp., 690 P 2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
—Exclusion. 
When evidence is excluded by the trial court, 
any error which may have resulted from such 
exclusion is cured when the substance of the 
evidence is later admitted through some other 
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1983). 
—Harmless error. 
Where there was no likelihood that the testi-
mony in question had any substantial bearing 
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause 
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). 
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting 
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial 
where there was other testimony connecting 
the defendant to the crime adduced before the 
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1982). 
The improper admission of hearsay evidence 
was harmless error where the exclusion of such 
evidence was not likely to produce a different 
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982). 
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
certain identification evidence was not a ruling 
upon which error can be predicated where 
there was other ample evidence of the defen-
dant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P 2d 
753 (Utah 1985). 
Trial court's error in restricting defense 
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's key witness concerning bias was harm-
less, where the jury had sufficient information 
to fully appraise the witness's biases and moti-
vations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987). 
Admission of improper impeachment evi-
dence was not prejudicial error, where the tes-
timony did not bear directly on whether defen-
dant did or did not do any of the acts with 
which he was charged, and there was no indi-
cation that the testimony improperly influ-
without the knowledge of the person making area of exceptions, the rule should simply state 
the communication, may know the content of that no privilege existed, rather than express-
the communication Problems of waiver are mg the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the 
dealt with by Rule 507. privilege The Committee wanted to avoid any 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the possible clashes with the common law concepts 
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
 0f «Waiver » 
and further endorsed the concept that in the 
Rule 504. Lawyer-client. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, 
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who 
is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a 
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the 
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the law-
yer in a rendition of professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain 
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, 
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with 
the lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the 
course of representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and 
the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative 
incidental to the professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, 
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of com-
mon interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's repre-
sentatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in 
any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a 
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corpo-
ration, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The 
person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to 
have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were 
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit 
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communica-
tion relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same 
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intes-
tate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication rele-
vant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the 
client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting wit-
ness; or 
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(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of com-
mon interest between two or more clients if the communication was made 
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered 
in an action between any of the clients. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 504 is 
based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United 
States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace 
and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) 
and is intended to be consistent with the ethi-
cal obligations of confidentiality set forth in 
Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of 
the United States Supreme Court to address 
the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), as 
to when communications involving representa-
tives of a corporation are protected by the priv-
ilege. The Committee rejected limiting the 
privilege to members of the "control group" 
and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition 
for "representative of the client" that includes 
within the privilege disclosures not only of the 
client and the client's formal spokesperson, but 
also employees who are specifically authorized 
to communicate to the lawyer concerning a le-
gal matter. The word "specifically" is intended 
to preclude a general authorization from the 
client for the client's employees to communi-
cate under the cloak of the privilege, but is 
intended to allow the client, as related to a 
specific matter, to authorize the client's em-
ployees as "representatives" to disclose infor-
mation to the lawyer as to that specific matter 
with confidence that the disclosures will re-
main within the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be 
directly paid by the lawyer as long as the rep-
resentative meets the requirement of being en-
gaged to assist the lawyer in providing legal 
services. Thus, a person paid directly by the 
client but working under the control and direc-
tion of the lawyer for the purposes of providing 
legal services satisfies the requirements of sub-
paragraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of 
the client who may be an independent contrac-
tor, such as an independent accountant, con-
sultant or person providing other services, is a 
representative of the client for purposes of sub-
paragraph (a)(5) if such person has been en-
gaged to provide services reasonably related to 
the subject matter of the legal services or 
whose service is necessary to provide such ser-
vice. 
The client is entitled not only to refuse to 
disclose the confidential communication, but 
also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or 
others who were involved in the conference or 
learned, without the knowledge of the client, 
the content of the confidential communication. 
Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507. 
Under subparagraph (b) communications 
among the various people involved in the legal 
matter, relating to the providing of legal ser-
vices, are all privileged, except for communica-
tions between clients. Those are privileged 
only if they are part of a conference with others 
involved in legal services. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, 
trustee, or similar representative of a corpora-
tion, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence" to claim the privi-
lege. Where there is a dispute as to which of 
several persons has claims to the rights of a 
previously existing entity, the court will be re-
quired to determine from the facts which en-
tity's claim is most consistent with the pur-
poses of this rule. 
The Committee considered and rejected an 
exception to the rule for communications in 
furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege 
where the lawyer's services are sought in fur-
therance of a crime or fraud is consistent with 
the trend in other states. The Committee con-
sidered extending the exception to include "in-
tentional torts," but concluded that because of 
the broad range of conduct that may be found 
to be an intentional tort, such an exception 
would create undesirable ambiguities and 
uncertainties as to when the privilege applies. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the 
privilege should be specifically enumerated, 
and further endorsed the concept that in the 
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state 
that no privilege existed, rather than express-
ing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the 
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any 
possible clashes with the common law concepts 
of "waiver." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Lawyer-client relationship. 
Where attorney advised defendant that he 
would not assist defendant in any capacity, le-
gal or otherwise, the relationship of attorney-
client never existed and communications made 
by the defendant to the attorney were not priv-
ileged. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 
1978). 
If a lawyer and his client engage in a crimi-
nal conspiracy to commit a crime or a tort, con-
trary to law and good morals, there is not a 
protected confidential relationship as to any 
statements made by the client. State v. Carter, 
578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978). 
The standard determining when the pres-
ence of a third party during communications 
between a lawyer and client results in a waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege is whether the 
third person's presence is reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances, not whether the pres-
ence of the third person is necessary for urgent 
or life saving procedures. Hofmann v. Conder, 
712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985). 
The privilege includes those who are partici-
pating in the diagnosis and treatment under 
the direction of the ph>sician or psychothera-
pist. For example, a certified social worker 
practicing under the supervision of a clinical 
social worker would be included. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to 
disclose the confidential communication, but 
also to prevent disclosure by the physician or 
psychotherapist or others who were properly 
involved or others who overheard, without the 
knowledge of the patient, the confidential com-
munication. Problems of waiver are dealt with 
by Rule 507. 
A.L.R. — Physician-patient privilege as ex-
tending to patient's medical or hospital 
records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The subject 
matter of Rule 507 was previously included in 
Utah Rules of Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40. The 
language recommended by the Committee, 
however, is largely that of proposed Federal 
Rules 511, 512 and 513, rules not included 
among those adopted by Congress. 
Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule 
507(a), replacing Rule 37. Proposed Federal 
Rule 512 became Rule 507(b), replacing Rule 
38. Proposed Federal Rule 513 became Rule 
507(c), replacing Rule 39. No replacement was 
adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee deter-
mined that the subject matter of that rule need 
not be covered by a rule of evidence. 
Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evi-
dentiary privileges is the protection of some 
societal interest or confidential relationship, 
the privilege should end when the purpose is 
no longer served because the holder of the priv-
The Committee felt that exceptions to the 
privilege should be specifically enumerated, 
and further endorsed the concept that in the 
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state 
that no privilege existed, rather than express-
ing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the 
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any 
possible clashes with the common law concepts 
of "waiver." 
The Committee did not intend this rule to 
limit or conflict with the health care data stat-
utes listed in the Committee Note to Rule 501. 
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child 
abuse reporting requirements contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et seq. 
ilege has allowed disclosure or made disclo-
sure. For the same reason, although Rule 37 
required a knowing waiver of the privilege, 
Rule 507(a) as drafted does not require such 
knowledge. A stranger to the communication 
may testify to an otherwise privileged commu-
nication, if the participants have failed to take 
reasonable precautions to preserve privacy. 
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosure of privi-
leged matter has occurred, although confiden-
tiality cannot be restored, the purpose of the 
privilege may still be served in some instances 
by preventing use of the evidence against the 
holder of the privilege. For that reason, privi-
leged matter may still be excluded when the 
disclosure was not voluntary or was made 
without an opportunity to claim the privilege. 
Subparagraph (c). 
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn from the 
invocation of a privilege might undermine the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 507. Miscellaneous matters. 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or 
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to 
the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails 
to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does 
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not 
admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was 
(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c) (1) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of privilege, 
whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper 
subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn there-
from. 
(2) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facili-
tate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. 
(3) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury 
might draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to 
instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do 
not apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked. 
717 (1922) (referred to in Committee Note); 
State v. Green, 578 P 2d 512 (Utah 1978); 
State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah 1979); 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986); 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
Green v. Bock Laundry — Federal Rule 
609(a)(1) in Civil Cases: The Supreme Court 
Takes an Imbalanced Approach, 1990 Utah L. 
Rev. 613. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 
§ 569 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507. 
A.L.R. — Permissibility of impeaching cred-
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the in-
herent power of the court to control the judicial 
process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 
210, 461 P.2d 56 (1969). There was no compa-
rable provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971), but it is comparable to cur-
rent Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-
ANALYSIS 
Cross-examination. 
Exclusion of witnesses. 
Leading questions. 
Cross-examination. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1989). 
ibility of witness by showing former conviction 
as affected by pendency of appeal from convic-
tion or motion for new trial, 16 A.L.R.3d 726. 
Propriety, on impeaching credibility of wit-
ness in civil case by showing former conviction, 
of questions relating to nature and extent of 
punishment, 67 A.L.R.3d 761. 
Right to impeach credibility of accused by 
showing prior conviction as affected by remote-
ness in time of prior offense, 67 A.L.R.3d 824. 
Key Numbers. — Witnesses <^= 345. 
Rules Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6 
Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is com-
parable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule 
43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
control of cross-examination by defense coun-
sel. See Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210, 
461 P.2d 56 (1969). 
The latitude that may be allowed in cross-
examination is largely within the discretion of 
the trial court, to be exercised and governed by 
the facts and circumstances of each particular 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions. 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not 
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the 
witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is basis of incompetency as a witness, Utah 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in accord Const., Art. I, Sec. 4. 
with Rule 20 [Rule 30], Utah Rules of Evidence Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
(1971). ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
Cross-References. — Religious belief not rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presenta-
tion. 
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the 
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to 
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credi-
bility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit 
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-exami-
nation. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant Alan Asay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
ALAN ASAY, 
Defendant. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 89-0905672CV 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The Counterclaim of Defendant/Counterclaimant Alan Asay 
having come on for trial on January 8, 1993, before the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding, 
the Court having noted that the claims of Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
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Defendant Zoll & Branch against Mr. Asay were discharged in 
bankruptcy pursuant to a February 10, 1992 Order of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court. The parties have proceeded to trial on the 
basis that the discharge does not affect any offsets to which Zoll 
& Branch may be entitled against Mr. Asay's Counterclaim. 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Zoll & Branch appeared at 
the trial by and through its counsel, B. Ray Zoll and Tom D. Branch 
of Zoll & Branch. Mr. Asay was present and represented by his 
counsel, Michael N. Zundel and Jeffery J. Devashrayee of Jardine, 
Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn. Mr. Asay first came forward and presented 
evidence in support of his Counterclaim, after which Zoll & Branch 
came forward and presented evidence in support of its claimed 
offsets against Mr. Asay's Counterclaim. 
The Court has considered the evidence and credibility of 
the witnesses, has carefully reviewed the arguments of counsel and 
the brief submitted by Mr. Asay, and has made an independent review 
of the pertinent statutes and case law. Now, being fully informed, 
the Court hereby finds the following facts and makes the following 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In early 1987, Mr. Asay was hired as an associate by 
the law firm of Zoll & Branch at a salary of $3,000.00 per month. 
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Mr, Asay brought with him and used his own office furniture and 
furnishings and computer/word processing system. 
2. Mr. Asay performed all of his work for Zoll & Branch 
on his computer system using a standard WordPerfect for DOS, word 
processing software program. He purchased the WordPerfect software 
himself in early 1987. 
3. At the time Mr. Asay became a full-time employee for 
Zoll & Branch, he made his computer system available to the firm 
and continued to use his own office furniture and furnishings. 
4. At that time, Zoll & Branch agreed to make payments 
toward the cost of Mr. Asay's computer equipment (by making 
payments to the credit card company financing Mr. Asay's 
acquisition of the computer system). However, no definite 
agreement was reached at that time as to whether or not Zoll & 
Branch would actually purchase the computer system and software. 
5. During his employment with Zoll & Branch, Mr. Asay 
learned to distrust Mr. B. Ray Zoll. Consequently, near the end of 
his employment, Mr. Asay placed the password "fuckoff" on the 
computer system to ensure that he controlled the system until a 
final agreement for its purchase was reached. 
6. Mr. Asay placed the password on the word processing 
files using the standard WordPerfect command, "Password"/"Add". 
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Once the password was revealed, it could be removed by using the 
standard WordPerfect command, M Pas sword"/" Remove •'. 
7. In mid-November, 1988, Mr. Asay gave notice that he 
intended to terminate his employment with Zoll & Branch and did so 
effective December 1, 1988. 
8. The amount of time which Mr. Asay billed during his 
employment with Zoll & Branch was fair and consistent with his 
obligation to Zoll & Branch and its clients and was fairly and 
accurately reported on Mr. Asay's time sheets. 
9. Zoll & Branch did not provide Mr. Asay with adequate 
support staff while he was with the firm. Consequently, Mr. Asay 
had to provide many services for himself and for Zoll & Branch 
which should have been provided by a non-lawyer support staff. 
10. Near the end of his employment and in conjunction with 
his announcement of his intent to leave the firm, Mr. Asay offered 
to sell the computer system and his office furniture and furnish-
ings to the firm for $4,356.00. 
11. Following negotiations, Zoll & Branch agreed to buy 
only the computer system for $1,030.00, which was the fair market 
value of the computer system. Mr. Asay accurately represented all 
material facts to Zoll & Branch during the negotiations. 
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12. The exact terms and conditions of the purchase of the 
computer system by Zoll & Branch were never finalized or formalized 
until after Mr. Asay gave notice of his intent to leave the firm. 
13. Mr. Asay informed Mr. Zoll that he would give him the 
password to the files on the computer system in exchange for full 
payment. 
14. The exchange occurred on December 1, 1988. On that 
date, Mr. Asay also revealed the password to Garry Wilmore, an 
attorney hired to replace Mr. Asay. 
15. The password provided full access to every file in the 
computer system. At no time did Mr. Asay sabotage the computer in 
any way. 
16. Any problems which Zoll & Branch had in accessing the 
computer system either pre-existed the exchange of the password for 
the check for the computer system or were the result of Zoll & 
Branch or its representatives being untrained or uneducated in the 
use of the computer system. 
17. None of Defendant's actions and conduct regarding the 
computer system were improper or inappropriate. 
18. After Mr. Asay terminated his employment, he removed 
his office furniture and furnishings from the firm and also took 
with him some computer diskettes which he had not sold to the firm. 
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19. When Mr. Asay left Zoll & Branch, he left behind all 
of his work product pertaining to any case on which he had worked. 
Mr. Asay also properly left behind his time sheets at Zoll & 
Branch, which should have been found by Zoll & Branch on the 
premises with no difficulty whatsoever. 
20. Upon Mr. Asay's departure from Zoll & Branch, he 
received the following two checks: (1) check number 2058 in the 
net amount of $1,176.75 for wages accrued during the last two weeks 
of his employment, and (2) check number 2059 in the amount of 
$1,176.75 as payment for the computer system. 
21. Both checks were dishonored upon presentment on 
December 8, 1988 because Zoll & Branch had ordered its bank to stop 
payment. 
22. In defense of Zoll and Branch's actions, Mr. Zoll 
testified that he stopped payment on the checks because Zoll & 
Branch had offsetting claims against Mr. Asay. The Court 
disagrees. Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the checks it issued to 
Mr. Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the 
password after he found out what it was. Mr. Zoll's testimony 
regarding the basis for the offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not 
credible. 
-6-
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2
 A L n o time prior to Mr, Asay's departure from, the firm 
did .. . anch give any nnl IVI* in MI r:. - .» l iirnii c La ] ineci 
any offset or deduction against the amounts otherwise due Mr. Asay. 
24. Zoll \ Branch never furnished Mr. Asay with a 
statement si lowi i ) 1.he 11 >l a 1 amount of ai I/J ieduc t:i on made i rnm his 
wages. 
25. Mr. Asay did not convert any documents or other 
property of Zoll k flrrinrh to his own use. 
26. Mr, Asay did not make any misrepresentat inmi to liolJ k 
Branch regarding any aspect of the computer he sold to Zoll t% 
Branch. 
2 7 . M i , Asay doll no! ." .Jandoi V Il I k lii.iincli «i ;• J all l e g e * ! i n 
the complaint filed : .;*;., 
28. There ^ justificat . :»• : Branch's stop 
payment or'-icr f tscks at issue in 
this case. 
2 9 . On December ^ " . : ie r.ar: : ^ 1 " : \ 
Branch f o r payment of 4 .- ^aqt^ ^ a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e Payment 
o f Wages Act ( t l le • '"" ft c 
and Mr. A s a y ' s c o u n t e r c l a i •.. s .•-: i . rought - . : . - n a i t e . ^.iy.> 
a f t e r t h e demand was r;ade as r e q ^ i r v - i rv ^- A^: "'h-- amount • : : r.n 
demai id d I d i i ::»t e x c e e a t .xit; a m< JM i m i < H i m i n \ i J i t j j u b u y clue au t h e 
t r i a 1 o f t h i s a c t i o n a s mo r e f u 1 1 y e xp 1 a i ne d b e 1 o w. 
- 7 -
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30 Zol ] & Branch responded with i 1 etter dated 
December 1 3 , 1! 988 , wi lerei n t - - -tened jii I f acja J list, 
Mr. Asay. On the same day,- Zol I & Branch commenced this action by 
filing a Complaint alleging that Mr. Asdy was liable to Zoil & 
,
:J in J* ' " M I f In? f i J in w a s 
entitled - .::ot-t againi' amounts otherwise owed to 
^ ne some uay, &u±± & Branch deposited 
c
 * J jfc^ -rK of the court with a paper entitled rei a ier 
of Payment" requesting that the clerk of the court hold the funds 
until all issues •• - . - «•-*• r^~ ved. 
3 on , 
testimony * *~ . . i ^ ;redibl*< .:•-.:. ;:e testimony : 
Mr', Zoll. 
33. MJ : A say i s enti 1::J ed to recei ve the following monetary 
damages from, Zol ] & Branch as a resu ] t of Zoll & Branch/s fa I lure 
to pay Mr. Asay hi s wages due and i ts failure to pay for the 
computer systent: 
Principal Interest 
Wages and p e n aities: 
Wage check 12/01/88 - * \ 500.00 
Statutory Continuation 
of Salary • $ 6,000.00 
$ • 10 
Plus interest from 02/01/1" * 
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or 
$ 2.0547 9 per diem,, for ] •; • . lays 
- 8 -
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Breach of Contract: 
Computer payment $ i, J 3 0 . 0 J 
Plus interest from 12/01/88 
through 01/08/93 § 10% or $ 2821 
per diem for 1,498 days $ 327 10 
Attorneys f Fees: 
Through preparation of Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment $ 12,000,00 
expenses and costs $ 1,602. ? 9 
TOTAL DAMAGES: $ 25,411.68 
3 : ' - entitled * • :a,*.:^ a; interest from 
Ann. .- , : 
35. The Court has considered al ] of the relevant factors 
in determi i i i i ig t:l: le reasoi lableness ui uiit: ie*- • " sr« -equested 
by Mr, As ay and h I s attorneys, Tn this raaa. • y of Mr. 
Asay, who is a licensed attorney i ^ ,:: <- ^as helpfu as well 
as the affidavit of Mr Asay's counsel, v v ••,-;-•: - lei. The 
C o u i: I: a ] s o o b s e r v e d t h e o r g a n i z < * - i i c 1 i M i: 
Asay's counsel conducted the presentatioi : v:: As iy z ase at 
trial All of the services provided by Mr. Asay's counsel, were 
rea s ona b 1 e am/1 n ec e s s a ry. 
- 9 -
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36 Tr* ;.* rates charged to Mr. As ay by his attorneys, 
£ - M- ui f. he J r (hi m legal s, are reasonable in 
light -*: > raining, experience and expertise of the service 
providers and as raeasurec , * * v- , rates customarily charged 
for* s ii'ii i "' *" 'iprv i res trie ^cixt .uct* "". IT, * \ : t.v . 
3/. Through November Tft. v 
legal services were provided . ^  attorneys 
connecv: - v - - < tttempts *a ecoiv: *\- wages do him 
fror • - -. - ' * 
actions or > i^  >.. - before .i : d:\<-: iLis action :.• 
beg\i .ncluding * "• <-* following actions rail in; t, oay : 
the • -, * i iiu| 1 his art I i tactic I U 
pressure :• , ^  -v ~:: abandoning tub legitimate claims against 
Zoll & Branch, refusing to provide discovery" as required by the 
Utah kuies ui L I V I I Procedure., and 4) alleging numerous defenses, 
includina factual ly contested offsets , t : • Mr. As ay *"s clai ins 
38. Upon consideration of all of the circumstances it is 
the judgmen- --.: • .* .*;t that Mr. As ay shoul d be awarded 
$ 1 2 , 0 0 0 0 0 : ees tl iroi lgh the preparatioi i of the 
findings o:i -. .;; asions of law and judgment in this case and 
that M r. As^- attorneys' out-of-pocket costs of $1,602.79 should 
also be awarded. 
-10-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 H I i II II h l i l t J I H * t l I i * * • -
Mr. Asay's unpaid wages or the amount due Mi:. Asay for the 
computer. 
2. z i payment, un 
the check **>*- < representing Mr. Asa% , ;.;e. earned durina 
the last ;. v L . T .:= employment : ;n*. *-v ci< f : ,00 
representing payment for - computer system. 
3 . . . 
Code in effect * .. ,-.. J^  employment was terminated, 
which provides that 1 .H absence •• *rr, ontractual ; r Dvision- * 
the conl 
previous notice- ;* i, ^ii^.i ,, ,a.- eceive -... 
wages at t:» specified place ..I payment it -_:-.- \-int.- : quitting." 
4. Z.OU. & Branch * :it;^ ' \ie^- : * * r 
Code in t*ff(*rt at the* time* > i< ; x* 
fail!ng \. urnish * .r «.* . statement showing the * :.J* 
amount or - -: " -• * ^ ** ^ - anu> rr m his wages. 
5 led I II :i:w a i x:i i >f $ 1 ,500 00 
constituting the gross pay c; •*: Asay's last check recei ved on 
December 
6, Mr. Asay is entitled to an award of a civil penalty of 
$6,000.00 pursuant to section T4-2y-lj(l) nt the Utah Code in i4U,il 
-11-
00460 
at the uixiie n. employment was terminatec n: r provides 
that. in the P 
hours ::i • demand therefo, :> waoes : . mployee shall 
continue from the date •: reparation until paid, but in no event to 
exceed in " '" yh, al ame rati? which I In? employee received at 
the time ..: separation," 
7. The deposit \ . * Branch of $i
 r 176.75 with the 
c -t * c ^ a "tender" of payment of the 
w a g e s :*. '• c .\: >+, oecause , ... : : r nf payment was conditional, 
being expressly conditioned / : r. rest:-;ution of all issues i n this 
case. 
8. Mr Asa^ i s ei iti tl ed t : a 1 1 aw a rd of $2 , 95] 2 9 as 
interest accruing from February JI , J 9 88 (the date on which his 
wages stopped accruing under the applicable statute) through 
Jan f"-;-
combined amount of wages and penalt ; <^  owing --^  \ ce. 
date, or $2,0547 9 per diem for - - lay r,. 
9. Mr* As ay is entitxeu. LU an award J.JO as 
payn 1 e 11I 1:oi: LI 1tJ <:oin(.)ut..e 1' 1 -»yK I.ein. 
10. Mr. As ay Is entitled to an award of $327.1.0 as 
interest accruing from December 1, 1988 through January 8, 19 9 3 at 
ton percent | I II t \ based en l\ I , OKI. 00 1 lie amount of the contract 
price for the computer system, or $.2 82 1 per diem for 1,498 days.. 
-12-
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11 Mr, Asay i a entitled to an award of $12,000.00 as 
reasonable aiiotiieyb iet«h pmsuatit m sei i ion ,4 2" I ni i no Of tin 
Code. 
12 • ^ av -: entitles * ~ r*- award of $12,000.00 as 
reasonable n m : l . i t u t i n<| (,i i n -
sequential damages incurred by MJ: , Asay. 
I.* :•*: Asay is entitled to an award of costs and expenses 
j I'Tout i o - , ,ition in the amount of $1,-673,79. 
1 .-.. .; - entitled to interest on the pri ncipal 
amounts awarded herein .-- •:• rate of 10% per annum from,, and after 
January -'• ' -i - .- udgment is entered i i I th is action and 
thereafter, inlet/esl dt, the rate ol 12+. 
unpaid portion of the judgment, until paid in full. 
Januaryr 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael R. Mu: ur 
P r e s i d i n g D i s t r i c t CpiirtP^pBge 
c:\docs\jjd\p\063.2 
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Tab 6 
Michael N. Zundel (#3755) 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee (#6209) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (80*' "^~ 7700 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant Alan Asay 
fiLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR I " md 
J^LTLME COUNTY, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
vs. 
ALAN AS AY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
ALAN AS AY, 
Coui l ber cJ a :ii mai it, 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Countered a :in Defendant, 
ORDER GRANTING 
ZOLL & BRANCH'S MOTION 
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND 
RELEASING GARNISHMENT 
9-0905672CV 
7 
This matter havirrr °^irse befnrQ *-n<=» rnnrf on February 
199J. ^ : : r. . : ., ". . i :Ji. : seeking - -nay pursuant 
Rule 62ft r?u!e;; — <*T~ — -.,4-., 
proceeding i _ 
D..^ 
herein; * * : J.-. :' i\. appearir: behalf of 
the judgment debtor Michae Zundel, Esq fr Tardinef 
Linebaugh, Brown 11 
judgmen' : .?-iit::. ; t;ii? i.rt: having considered the arguments and 
representations ui counsel and good cause appearing therefor; it is 
1 lereby 
ORDERED, t h a t upon, compliance wi th a l l of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
t h i s Order by ZolJ k Branch, a l l proceedings and act ions ' enforce 
in i u i In i I I I in | in li iitienit (Hit BfO'i I in I h i : i : a s e i n fciv~ ' ~~ * ~~ *~~>v 
s h a l l b e s t a y e d i i n t i L May i[j, 1 lJ,ll I | III w e e k s iiinul 
F e b r u a r y 2 3 , 199 1 ) , m u n t i l t h i r t y d a y s a f t e r Z o l l r a n c r ; s 
m o t i o n t n r m>w ! i i . i l iinil m o t i o n l o a l t e r o r a m e n d j u d g m e n t a r e 
h e a i 11 mi I I l» if j dei I I i, I III m i i >u i I  In m ( " " I n r v t " i I i i • r i \ < in i ' iiiiiii I i I i 
further 
ORDERED, that as a condition precedent to the effectiveness 
I Ih In1, iili-Mcd hiMfiii, MMII h lliiinrli /.hall provide securi ty to 
Alan Asay, as provided herein, securing payment ot the entire 
judgment p.] us i nterest as provided in the judgment; and 
further 
I I H M l ' ! Ill II I I I III II I  1 I I I II i I I ! i H i 1 II I I I 1 II i l I II III 1 I I I I H » M J S S ] f I I I Il I I I I 
Clerk ot the Court be, and same hereby aief held h\ the tleik ai» 
security for payment judgment issued in flavor of Alan As ay 
V till the court on 
-2-
J:; .: December lyBd (pursuant * document *iv izlod "Tender 
o_ Paymer * *;f;"it - Deposit eceipt account 
"< issuea 
principal amount f $?5, -JJO . • further 
ORDERED, tha >• v-~ *^ protect <- collateral described 
^ branch, * Branch shall execute a security agreement 
* A-.: .- J- ^he form attached hereto as Exhibit: " ? 
^tement; and further 
ORDEREt it I ne L-. -
Certificate Deposit No. 14830034033 •- eissuec •:. 
name * "Clerk :^ r ! :udiciai District Court, Case No. 
r 
ORDERED, ; -iat .ii . garnishments heretofore issued pursuant 
l i in tinI. Judgmen; ! avi . this action, shall be 
,.(l ( l :e with this order by nv±L 
branch. 
TED this // day of March, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
SIT IN H y Agreement 
!THIS AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into the 
day of March, 1993, by ZOLL & BRANCH, P.C. ("Debtor"), whose 
address is 5300 South 360 West, #360, Murray, Utah 84123 (federal 
tax ID number 87-0458492), in favor of ALAN B. ASAY, whose address 
is 131 Third Avenue, #4, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 ("Secured 
Party-). 
Recitals: 
ft Judgment. On February 17, 1993, a Judgment (the 
"Judgment") was entered in the case (the "Case") of Zoll & Branch 
v. Alan Asay, Civil No. 89-0905672, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (the "Court"), for the principal sum of 
$25,424.74, together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% 
per annum. 
B. Motion for New Trial. .db ;. iled with the 
court a Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and has requested a stay oi execution pending the 
court's ruling on those motions. 
C. Security for Stay. Debtor has offerer a certificate 
of deposit and funds on deposit with the clerk c * •" — rt as 
security for a stay 
A g r e e m e n t : 
Article 1 
Security Interest 
1.1. Grant of security Interest. Debtor hereby grants 
Secured Party a security interest (the "Security Interest") in all 
of Debtor's right, title and interest, whether now existing or 
hereafter acquired, in and to the following (collectively the 
"Collateral") in order to secure payment of the entire judgment 
plus interest: 
Certificate. That certain Certificate of 
Deposit (the "Certificate") issued by American Investment Bank as 
Certificate No. 14830034033 in the amount of $25,000.00 in the name 
of Zoll & Branch, P.C, c, 'o Third District Court, Civil 
No. 890505672, and all proceeds derived therefrom however 
designated, including money, general intangibles, and substitute 
certificates of deposit. 
C G 5:: S 
deposited with the clerk of 
the court in the case on or about December 12, 1988, pursuant to a 
document entitled "tender of payment." 
Article 2 
Status of Collateral 
2 ] Possession of Collateral. Debtor shall cause the 
certificate to be reissued to "Clerk of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Civil No, 89-0905672" and the clerk of court shall hold the 
certificate and cash for the benefit of Alan Asay in order to 
establish and perfect the Security Interest in the Collateral. 
Notwithstanding Secured Party's Security Interest in the 
Collateral, Debtor shall continue to own the Collateral, subject to 
the Security Interest and the provisions of this Agreement. 
2.2. Accrual
 Qf interest. All interest that accrues on 
the Collateral shall accrue for the account of the Debtor, as owner 
of the Collateral, but such interest shall remain subject to this 
Security Agreement as part, of the Collatera ] 
2.3. Affirmation of Judgment. If the District Court 
affirms Secured Party's Judgment against Debtor, then Secured Party 
may, after 30 days following entry of the District Court's Order, 
redeem the Certificate and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction 
of the Judgmentc-#*^MT *7X«>«~/j< ^ ^o^£„ ^  /** (?*,»* *^J*]) 
2.4. Reversal of Judgment. If the District Court 
reverses Secured Party's Judgment against Debtor in whole, then 
Secured Party shall release its Security Interest in the 
Col lateral. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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2.5. Renewal of Certificate. During the term of th I s 
Agreement, the clerk of the court may renew the Certificate, or 
with the proceeds of the Certificate (or replacement certificates 
of deposit), purchase one or more, replacement certificates of 
deposit with financial institutions that are insured by the Federal 
Deposit Corporation, for terms not to exceed 90 days. All such 
renewed or purchased certificates of deposit shall form part of the 
Collateral. American Investment Bank is hereby instructed to 
deliver the original certificate and all replacements or reissues 
thereof directly t : ' 1_ " of the court at the following 
address: 
Clerk of the Court 
Tl i :i rd Judicial District ' 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attn: David Shewell 
DEBTOR: 
ZOLL & BRANCH,- F.C. 
c;\docs\mnz\d\3 55.1 
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COts 
Fits? citnawr CSL^.T 
Tnira JLaiciai L/.siiiCt 
MAY 2 5 1993 
Michael N. Zundel (#3755) 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee (#6209) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant Alan Asay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Defendant. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. ] 
ZOLL & BRANCH, | 
Counterclaim Defendant. ; 
ORDER ALLOWING EXTENSION | OF BOND EXPIRATION DATE 
i Civil No. 89-0905672CV 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 1993, 
upon stipulation to extend the expiration date for the bond 
currently in possession of the Court serving as collateral for the 
money judgment entered in favor of Alan Asay and against Zoll & 
CG5G5 
SAL."5 L A K E Cy<*>sX.y 
By S AMCJhrtS 
Deputy Clerk 
Branch, and it appearing that the parties have stipulated that the 
bond will expire on June 25, 1993; the Court having considered the 
Stipulation to Extend Bond Expiration Date, and the Court being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the expiration date for the bond is extended 
for thirty (30) days until June 25, 1993. 
DATED this o?<S> day of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
c:\docs\jjd\p\109 
Hondirable Mi-cfetel 11. Mui^liy 
Presading D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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•» «**•* •• re> •* - c*- -"J?1 
B. Ray Zoll 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILES SSCT-TTT 
Third jjfjic.fc! District 
JUN 2 3 1333 
SALT IAK£ COUNTY 
uojju.y Cifcik 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Defendant. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0905672CV 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to 
Extend Stay of Execution Pending Location of the Court file. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion and being fully 
advised, hereby grants Plaintiff's motion and extends the 
expiration date of the bond at issue in this case until such time 
as the Court file can be located and until the Court can make a 
ruling on Plaintiff's Request for Expedited Hearing on Motion for 
New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 
1. 
coon 
t ~l u y u ' • ^ V 
DATED this ^3 day of June, 1993, 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this 
day of June, 1993: 
Michael N. Zundel 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Attorneys for Defendant Alan Asay 
2. 
Tab 7 
JUL ? n ^"1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Defendant. 
ALAN ASAY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
SUMMARY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 890905672 
Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant has moved for a new trial 
or to alter or amend judgment• The motion seeks to change specific 
findings. Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, that evidence 
is not the equivalent of fact. The court heard all the evidence 
and, after viewing the demeanor of witnesses and making judgments 
of credibility, made its findings. If, as in this case, there is 
conflicting evidence, there will necessarily be a conflict between 
the findings and some evidence, the evidence which the court 
rejected in its role as a factfinder. 
C0632 
ZOLL V. ASAY PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
The court finds it ironic that on the one hand plaintiff 
complains that the value of this case did not merit the amount of 
fees incurred by defendant and yet complains that the court 
improperly limited the time allowed plaintiff to present its case. 
The court was very concerned about this case, invoked Rule 611, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, allocated 50% of a trial day to each party 
and was a timekeeper for the time consumed. Plaintiff actually 
used more time than defendant and had adequate time to present its 
claims and defenses. It was the plaintiff's decision how it was to 
use its time. It is the court's view that plaintiff misallocated 
its time, spending too much time on unimportant matters and too 
little on important matters. 
For the forgoing reasons, plaintiff's motion is denied. The 
parties are to confer with the clerk to schedule not more than one 
hour for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to augment 
fees. 
C0633 
ZOLL V, ASAY PAGE THREE SUMMARY DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Summary Decision and Order, to the following, this p/ 
day of July, 1993: 
B. Ray Zoll 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Michael L. Zundel 
Attorney for Defendant 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
-rY7 StoU 
r. - - -. 4 
Tab 8 
Michael N. Zundel (#3' 
Jeffery J. Devashrayfe 
F'LED IN CLERK S 
oalt Lako County OFFICE Utah 
F6209) 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimant 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
vs. 
ALAN AS AY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ALAN AS AY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
1/?//£/ 
ORDER AUGMENTING JUDGMENT 
AND RELEASING CASH BOND 
TO ALAN ASAY 
Case No.. 89-0905672 CV 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
This matter having come before the court on August 2, 1993, 
upon Alan Asay's Motion to Augment the Award of Costs and Attor-
neys' Fees in this action; the Court having considered the 
affidavit of Michael N. Zundel filed in support of the motion, and 
having provided the judgment debtor, Zoll & Branch, opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Zundel regarding the fees and costs described in 
Mr. Asay's motion; and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the judgment entered in favor of Alan As ay in 
this action dated February 17, 1993, be, and the same hereby is, 
increased by the principal sum of $ nil. sc in order to 
reimburse Mr. Asay for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees 
expended in preserving and collecting said judgment; and it is 
further 
ORDERED, that the stay of execution heretofore entered in 
this action is hereby vacated and the Clerk of this Court is 
directed to redeem the certificate of deposit held by this Court as 
a cash bond and to deliver the proceeds thereof to Michael N. 
Zundel, Esq., Mr. Asay's attorney; and it is further 
ORDERED, that Mr. Asay shall, within ten (10) days after 
receipt of the funds, file a Notice of Partial Satisfaction in this 
action. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michael R/Murphy 
Presiding District Judge 
c:\docs\mnz\p\2764 
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Tab 9 
B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZOLL & BRANCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN AS AY, 
Defendant. 
ALAN AS AY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
Counterdefendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 89-0905672 CV 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
COMES now Plaintiff Zoll & Branch, by and through its counsel 
of record, B. Ray Zoll, pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and appeals the Judgment entered in the 
above-captioned case representing as follows: 
1. The party taking the appeal is the Plaintiff, Zoll & 
Branch. 
1. 
C3G50 
2. The Judgments appealed from are the Order Releasing Bond 
and Order Augmenting Attorney's Fees, filed the 2nd day of August, 
1993, as well as the Order denying Motion for New Trial or in the 
Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend Findings, filed on July 20, 
1993. 
3. The Court from which the appeal is taken is the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
4. The Court to which the appeal is taken is the Court of 
Appeals of Utah. 
DATED this / day of August, 1993. 
%^7 
B. &'ay Ztfll / M 
Attorney for /Plain^ff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this \ QT, day of 
August, 1993, to the following: 
Michael Zundel 
Jeffrey Devashrayee 
370 East South Temple 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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